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The purpose of this thesis is to use wargaming and simulation to gain 
insight into the effective employment of a new Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR) system, the Adaptive Joint C4ISR Node (AJCN).  The AJCN provides 
the supported commander with several capabilities, to include: range extension, 
waveform bridging, signal intelligence, electronic warfare, and information 
operations.  Two methods are used to gain insight to the support generation of 
the concept of operations for the AJCN's employment.  The first method is 
wargaming.  The wargaming method utilized a class of NPS students and the 
JCATS combat simulation model.  The wargaming generated insights concerning 
the AJCN's employment.  The second method is the use of a constructive 
simulation model, POA 2.  Insights gained from the two methods include:  the 
need for commanders to differentiate the AJCN and its supporting platform; the 
need for effective information processing techniques; the importance of 
maintaining at least two-tiers of AJCN coverage to enhance situational 
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The purpose of this thesis is to gain insights into the employment of an 
emerging Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
(C4I) system as an enabler for network centric warfare.  The system's intent is to 
provide interoperability between C4I systems in use throughout the Department 
of Defense (DoD) and the civilian sector.  This thesis addresses insights on the 
employment of the system and helps contribute to the development of a 
CONOPS for the system.   
B. BACKGROUND 
"Network-centric warfare enables warfighters to leverage…information 
advantage to dramatically increase combat power through self-synchronization 
and other network-centric operations." [Ref. 1]  It provides a means to achieve 
information superiority, a key component of Joint Vision 2010/2020 and the 
Department of Defense's Transformation Strategy. 
The future force needs the ability to efficiently and reliably move the 
increasing amounts of digital data around the battlespace at the 
time and place of its choosing with a minimum of infrastructure.  
Continued modernization and digitization of the force increases the 
demand for information, sensors and bandwidth. Buying more 
existing platforms is not a viable answer. The heavy demand on 
command and control (C2) and intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) assets, indeed the electromagnetic spectrum 
itself, is unsupportable with our current, specialized systems.  
Communications at the theater/operational level, between the Joint 
Task Force and forward deployed elements, and between 
geographically separated elements, rely heavily on military and 
commercial satellite communications.  Highly sophisticated sensors 
and Electronic Warfare (EW) systems are few in number, yet their 
demand is growing exponentially.  In addition to the fiscal and 
logistical drain, continued use of these systems alone creates the 
possibility of single points of failure on the battlefield.  Currently 
fielded capabilities consist primarily of single-mission systems that 
are tied to specific platforms.  Even more importantly, these 
systems are not interoperable and are not able to support 
operations with disparate coalition and civil systems and thus inhibit 
our ability to achieve and sustain information superiority. [Ref. 2] 
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A key attribute of a network-centric force is the state of being effectively 
linked to distributed and disparate units and platforms on the battlefield.  The 
historical process of service-independent acquisition prior to the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986 facilitated a significant hindrance to the new concept of 
network-centric warfare. [Ref. 8]  Looking only within the communications realm, 
unit-level communication between units of different services is prohibitive solely 
on the basis of disparate technologies that cannot inherently translate each 
others' signals.  As DoD transformation seeks to create Joint Task Forces that 
are composed of units from varied specialties and services, communication 
between these units is foundational to mission success.  Until the core systems 
can be tailored to communicate with one another or replaced by a single DoD-
service-wide system, bridges must be made to facilitate the Joint Task Forces' 
employment.  Success in this endeavor must begin at the acquisition process. 
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) 
is a cyclic process used by the Department of Defense to establish "the 
framework and process for decision making on future programs.  The ultimate 
objective of PPBES is to provide the operational commanders-in-chief the best 
mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within fiscal constraints." [Ref. 3]  
The goal of the PPBES supports the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which 
states that one of the functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is: 
Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the program 
recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments 
and other components of the Department of Defense for a fiscal 
year conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and 
with the priorities established for the requirements of the unified 
and specified combatant commands. [Ref. 4] 
Although the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and PPBES is to promote 
jointness in the acquisition process, the individual services' are drawn to methods 
of self-preservation that promote their strengths on the battlefield.  This practice 
results in independent and isolated development strategies that hinder and 
impede the ability of the various services to effectively operate together on the 
battlefield.  The practice of filling the needs of the whole military by four or more 
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isolated services was found unacceptable by the current Secretary of Defense. 
[Ref. 5]  The Secretary of Defense initiated studies into the methods used by the 
Department of Defense to develop, resource, and provide joint capabilities.  The 
desired endstate; enforce the source of force requirement generation from the 
individual services to the Combatant Commanders (CoComs) [formerly CINCs].  
The goal is to prevent the redundancy of capabilities among the services and 
force the cultural shift toward joint operations as the primary means of going to 
battle.   
It is the independent services' system of acquisition that brought about the 
need for the system described in this thesis.  Interoperability of C4I systems has 
been a continuing hindrance to the easy, efficient, and effective employment of 
joint forces acting in unison on the battlefield. [Ref. 6]  The funding, research, and 
development of disparate C4I systems over the years has created a "wall" 
between the services.  This "wall" is comprised of communication systems that 
can only interact with other systems inherent to the respective service.  When the 
services are called upon to operate in conjunction with one another, 
"workarounds" and "quick-fixes" are employed to allow for the temporary, yet 
unreliable, interoperability of systems.  Often the communication between 
services must go through the highest levels of command to a point where a 
"bridge" between C4I systems is present. [Ref.2, 5-6]  The latter incurs great 
danger to the units operating within close proximity where timing of unit 
movement is critical.   
Until the consequences of the former "stovepipe" methodology have been 
resolved from the foundational levels of military combat systems, the requirement 
remains for the services to effectively operate in concert to win the nations wars.  
One technology to aid in this endeavor will be explored in this thesis, the 
Adaptive Joint C4ISR Node (AJCN). 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The intent of the following research questions is to frame the conduct of 
the information gathering process and to gain insight into the issues that affect 
the  AJCN's employment during operations. 
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1. Given a scenario--How many AJCN nodes are required? 
 
2. What are the critical vulnerabilities to the AJCN and its capabilities? 
 
3. What can be done to mitigate the threats to the AJCN? 
 
4. Which levels of AJCN nodes most effect operations? 
 
5. What can be done to mitigate friendly fratricide?   
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
 The focus of this thesis is on evaluating the impact of the AJCN as an 
enhanced information warfare capability in a wargame scenario.  Research will 
be conducted using two methods. 
 The first method incorporated wargaming using both the tabletop method 
with a situation map, and a constructive simulation in the "human in the loop" 
mode.  The tabletop method provided an "open" wargame in that all the players 
had "essentially free access to all available information about each side's forces 
and capabilities (but not about plans!)." [Ref. 7, 175]  The constructive simulation 
provided a "closed" wargame experience to "better simulate the 'fog of war' by 
introducing limits on the information available to the players." [Ref. 7, 175]  The 
Wargaming course taught at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the 
platform for the wargame.   
The wargame class was divided into two teams, the friendly and opposing 
forces teams. Each team had a designated commander while the rest of the 
team members were given various roles as primary staff officers on their team. 
The teams were then issued their mission, upon which they conducted their 
mission analysis.  
During mission analysis, the commander and the staff draw together all 
available intelligence and information, orient it to the assigned mission, 
develop an understanding of the tasks to be accomplished, and formulate a 
rough concept of how to best accomplish those tasks. The result is an initial 
statement of the commander’s intent and the receipt of the commander’s 
  planning guidance that focuses the remainder of the planning process. 
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Building on the knowledge gained through mission analysis, the 
commander and staff develop a concept for carrying out the required tasks that 
embodies the commander’s intent.  This concept,  or Course of Action (COA), 
 encompasses  general  schemes  for the  execution  of  maneuver,  fires, 
 logistics,  and  other supporting functions that are necessary for the successful 
conduct of the mission. The staff develops several COAs based on the 
commander’s intent and planning guidance.  
After they are developed, the COAs are analyzed and compared in an 
effort to identify the best COA and prepare concept of operations needed to 
implement that COA. The staff conducted a detailed analysis of each COA, and 
each principal staff officer prepared a formal estimate of supportability.  The 
COAs were then wargamed to predict the action, reaction, and counteraction 
dynamics of each COA.   At the conclusion of this "open" forum wargame, a COA 
was chosen for the "closed" wargame. 
The "friendly" and "enemy" COAs were then executed in the Joint Conflict 
and Tactical Simulation (JCATS).  The students controlled the movement of their 
units and were able to "see" only the enemy that their reconnaissance and 
surveillance systems were able to see on the digital battlefield, thus epitomizing 
the "closed" mode of wargaming.     
 The second method involved using the "closed loop" capability of POA2 to 
conduct several iterations of a combat scenario with varying levels of AJCN 
incorporation.  This iterative method allowed the evaluation of combat outcomes 
to offer insight as to the most beneficial employment of the AJCN system in a 
given scenario.  Although the scenario is not universal in application across the 
broad spectrum of possible combat situations, it provides a possible baseline 
upon which to build further analytic calculations for appropriate levels of AJCN 
employment.   
 Using both wargaming and simulation allows the insight gained to be more 
balanced vice the use of only one method.  It is not just the employment of the 
system that is of interest, but also how the combatants (i.e. staff) seek to employ 
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the system given their particular predispositions and experience.  The insights 
gained from both methods individually and collectively are described in detail in 
the conclusion chapter of this thesis.   
 Insights gleaned from the first method arise primarily from the observation 
of the staff's employment of the system vice more quantitative means of analysis.  
However, the second method relies completely on quantitative analysis to gain 
insight into the AJCN's employment based on the nature of the method itself.  For 
the second method, Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) are required to obtain a 
proper perspective on the quantitative results. 
 The Measures of Effectiveness used in evaluating the AJCN are based on 
the AJCN capabilities as modeled in POA2.  The following MOEs are used for 
the analysis of the closed loop runs: 





 We desire a minimal Force Exchange Ratio which relates a greater 
situational awareness provided or not provided by the AJCN through that ability 
for friendly forces to engage more enemy targets and thereby decrease the 
enemy's effectiveness through attrition. 
Data Requirements:  Friendly kill count and enemy kill count. 







We desire a FER of close to 0.  This relates that friendly forces incurred fewer  
proportional casualties than the enemy force. 
Data Requirements:  Friendly kill count, initial friendly force level, enemy kill 
count and initial enemy force level. 
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MOE 3:  Friendly Kill Ratio: 
FriendlyKilledByFriendly
FriendlyForceLevel
    
 We desire minimal Friendly Kill Ratio relating AJCN's success in 
disseminating friendly position data. 
 Data Requirements:  Count of friendly forces killed by friendly forces and 
initial friendly force Level. 




 We desire maximum proportion of enemy forces "seen" by all blue forces 
to allow friendly forces greater situational awareness. 
Data Requirements:  Number of enemy entities "seen" by all blue forces 
and total number of enemy entities on battlefield. 






 We desire minimal number of AJCNs destroyed relating successful 
deployment, utilization, and recovery of the AJCN systems. 
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 Data Requirements:  Number of AJCNs destroyed by what type of enemy 
system and initial number of AJCN fielded for mission. 
E. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
 The primary purpose of this thesis is to gain insight on an emerging 
platform as an enabler for network centric warfare.  Furthermore, we intend to 
assist in the development of the CONOPS for this system.  The capabilities of the 
system will be represented in wargaming and simulations to discover their level 
of impact on mission success. 
F. THESIS SCOPE 
This thesis will consider the primary capabilities provided by the AJCN in 
their delivered state.  The goal of this thesis requires only that the AJCN's 
capabilities, described in the AJCN Operational Concept (OPCON) (ACTD 
Version 1.2) [Ref. 8], be modeled to observe their influence on the outcome of a 
battle.  The effect of the AJCN's capabilities to improve or detract from the 
friendly force's performance will provide insights into the effective operational use 











II. ADAPTIVE JOINT C4ISR NODE (AJCN) 
A. ADAPTIVE JOINT C4ISR NODE (AJCN) 
The Adaptive Joint C4ISR node is being developed by a BAE Systems-led 
team of Department of Defense contractors.  The system is comprised of two 
parts, the Mission Payload Segment (MPS) and the Control and Reporting 
Segment (CRS) software.  The MPS will be carried by a variety of manned and 
unmanned airborne platforms.  The CRS software, which controls the 
employment of the MPS, will be installed on various existing ground, air, and 
sea-based computer workstations.  The AJCN provides four mission capabilities:  
Communications bridging, relay and reach back; SIGINT; Electronic Warfare 
(EW); and Information Operations (IO).  "The four mission capabilities will 
synergistically work together on a single scaleable payload to provide a unique 
and much needed capability for military commanders at tactical and operational 
echelons with a reach back capability to strategic assets." [Ref. 2] 
1. Communications 
The AJCN supports three communication functional capabilities; range 
extension, waveform bridging, and reach back.   
a. Range Extension 
Range extension is the capability for like radio systems to 
communicate beyond the designed range.  The system will receive a 
transmission on one frequency and relay the content to the destination radio 
system on a different frequency.  This capability currently exists within the DoD 
services, but is primarily performed by ground-based systems that rely on the 
choice of high elevation terrain that provides the best Line of Sight (LOS) to the 
supported units.  Emplacement of ground based communication relay stations is 
a time consuming and security driven process that does not lend itself to the 
flexibility required of a quickly moving ground force.  These stations are normally 
emplaced prior to friendly forward movement on the battlefield and are stationed 
as far forward as is feasible given the enemy's posture.  Thus, their coverage is 
ideal for the initial phases of friendly ground force movement, but is quickly 
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diminished once ground forces have moved any considerable distance.  Once 
the relay stations' utility is consummated, the teardown and relocation process is 
laborious and time consuming and does not allow for the continuous coverage 
provided by an airborne relay platform. 
b. Waveform Bridging 
Waveform Bridging is defined as the ability to effectively receive 
information transmitted in one wave format (waveform) and retransmit the 
information in another waveform.  There is currently no system used within the 
DoD that provides this capability.  The long-term solution to this problem resides 
within the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program, which "will provide 
reliable multi-channel voice, data, imagery, and video communications-and 
eliminate communications problems caused by "stovepipe" legacy systems." 
[Ref. 17]   However, until the program is fully deployed and fielded, the need for 
waveform bridging capabilities remains key to mission success for both military 
applications and combined civilian-military operations, like those conducted in 
support of Homeland Defense operations or exercises.  The scenario depicted in 
Figure 1 demonstrates pictorially the AJCN's capability to "translate" between a 
cell phone's, SINCGARS, AM, and FM waveforms.  The functionality enables 
interservice, intraservice, and interagency communications to accommodate a 











Figure 1.   Pictorial representation of AJCN performing Waveform Bridging and  
SIGINT Missions 
 
c. Reach Back 
Reach Back is defined as "the ability to communicate with someone 
who is outside the theatre of operations" [Ref. 2]  Currently, reach back 
capabilities are limited to Special Operation Forces and high echelon unit 
headquarters using secure satellite links and cutting edge technologies.  The 
system will provide the ability for linkage to be available to more levels within the 
chain of command, affording more flexibility to the commanders at all levels.  
This will be accomplished through a CRS-provided network interface (Secure 
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) or Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communications System (JWICS)) that will establish connectivity with higher 
headquarters elements and provide a secure means of transmitting voice, data, 
and video formats. 
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2. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) 
The AJCN's suite of SIGINT functionality covers a large range of 
capabilities.  These capabilities include:  signal detection, signal demodulation, 
signal identification, Direction Finding (DF), emitter location, and electronic 
mapping of the battlefield.  Signal detection is the ability of a signal receiver to 
sense and capture the emitted signal.  Signal identification is the ability to 
analyze the detected signal and identify its frequency.  The signal demodulation 
takes that signal and recovers the "content" to some analyzable format.  The 
Direction Finding capability performs a reverse trajectory operation on the 
incoming signal to determine the direction from the receiver to the emitter.  The 
direction finding capability complements the ability to determine the emitter 
location using a triangulation calculation using several samples of the incoming 
signal direction over a period of time.  All these functions work together to 
generate an electronic mapping of the battlefield portraying the friendly and 
enemy emitters on the ground.   
3. Electronic Warfare (EW) 
The AJCN will contain the capability to jam enemy radio frequencies.  The 
CRS operator can either manually select the frequency and jamming type or set 
the system to automatically jam when energy is detected on a pre-programmed 
set of frequencies (Jam on Energy).  The AJCN is capable of continuously 
jamming a single signal continuously or jamming multiple targets by timesharing 
the jamming at a predetermined rate. [Ref. 2] 
4. Information Operations (IO) 
IO capabilities include support of Radio Broadcast operations and 
Computer Network Attack (CNA).  Radio Broadcast operations include the 
broadcast or re-broadcast of FM signals in support of Psychological Operations 
(PSYOPS) missions.  The CNA allows for the intercept and attack of "otherwise-
inaccessible wired targets by entering the network through a wireless node."  
This accommodates an attack strategy of injecting deceptive messages into a 
victim's data network [Ref. 2] 
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The capabilities listed above are not all inclusive with respect to what the 
AJCN's full suite of functions will contain in its final configuration.  These merely 
relate a portion of the capabilities that are being exercised as part of the 
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). 




• Range Extension - Beyond Line of Sight
• Surrogate Satellite - Supplemental Capacity
• Bridging of Dissimilar Waveforms -
- e.g. SINCGARS to Link 16
• High Capacity Trunk Lines - Air to Air Links
• Reach Back - Communications to National Assets
• Interoperate with and Augment existing 
systems
• Small UAVs get close to the target links
–Detection of Weak Signals
–Improved Co-channel Interference 
Mitigation
• Provide Low Power Jamming Close to Targets
–Reduce Fratricide
• Deceptive Data Jamming
• Network Infiltration




Figure 2.   AJCN Mission Summary 
 
B. AJCN PLATFORMS 
For the purpose of this thesis, three platforms used to field the AJCN MPS 
will be evaluated during this study.  The AJCN MPS is scaleable to adapt to a 
variety of platforms, both aerial and ground-based.  The capability of the AJCN 
MPS is based on the platform upon which it is mounted, primarily due to the 
power supply capabilities of the platform and the weight constraints imposed by 
the platform itself.  The purpose of employing multiple "tiers" of coverage is to 
provide the capability of a "self-healing" array of coverage for the supported 
units.  This redundancy not only provides for fluid coverage on the occasion of 
loss of a platform but also allows for greater intercommunication capabilities for 
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units far beyond conventional radio-based communication systems.  Following is 
a basic description of each of the aerial platforms ordered by their operating 
altitude, from least to greatest. 
 
1. RQ-5/Hunter 
The RQ-5/Hunter UAV provides the foundational level of support for this 
study.  The Hunter has an operating ceiling of 15,000 feet and a maximum speed 
of 106 knots with an endurance of 11.6 hours.  It has a payload capacity of 50lbs.  
Given the MPS weight restrictions and the altitude; the radius of coverage for the 
AJCN on the Hunter is 50 miles.  [Ref. 18]  The Office of the Secretary of 
Defense conducted an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reliability Study which revealed 
that the Hunter has a reliability rating of .82 and a mishap rate of 16 per 100,000 
hours. [Ref. 19]   The Hunter operates at the lowest altitude and will therefore 
comprise the lowest tier of coverage.  
 
 





2. KC-135 Stratotanker 
The KC-135 Stratotanker is the second tier platform used for this study. At 
an operating altitude of 25,000 feet and a speed of 530mph it can range 1,500 
miles if conducting refueling operations and 11,000 miles if it is conducting a 
"ferry" mission.  The AJCN MPS mounted on this platform provides a 90-mile 
radius of coverage.  The marked advantages of this platform over the other two 
examined here is the increased power supply provided by the aircraft, its 
increased ability of range, and greater time of remaining aloft. 
 
 
Figure 4.   KC-135 Stratotanker 
 
 
3. Global Hawk 
The Global Hawk UAV provides the platform for the high-tier AJCN MPS.  
It has an operating ceiling of 65,000 feet and maximum cruising speed of 340 
knots.  The MPS mounted on the Global Hawk can provide a 150-mile radius of 
coverage.  As of May 2003, the Global Hawk has an accident rate of 167.7 per 
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100,000 flight hours. [Ref. 22]  The Global Hawk has a "ferry" range of 15,500 
miles and an operating endurance of 36 hours.  This UAV comprises the top-tier 
of coverage for this analysis. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Global Hawk UAV 
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III. SCENARIO 
The scenario for the wargame took place in the South China Sea. This 
region of the world was chosen for the wargame because of its potential military 
threat. This threat is well documented and presented in the United States 
Department of Defense FY04 Report to Congress on Peoples Republic of China 
Military Power. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea that covers an area of 3.5 
million square kilometers (sq km). It is located between the Pacific and the Indian 
Ocean, thus providing a critical link to the continents of Asia, Africa, Europe and 
Australia. States with borders on the sea (clockwise from north) include: the 
People's Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), the Philippines, 
Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam.  The 
South China Sea Islands is an archipelago of over 250 around 1-km² islands, 
atolls, cays, shoals, reefs, and sandbars, most of which have no indigenous 
people. The Islands are subdivided into four sub-archipelagos (listed by area 
size): 
* The Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands)  
* The Macclesfield Islands (Zhongsha Islands)  
* The Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands)  
* The Pratas Islands (Dongsha Islands)  
Because of the economic, military, and transportational importance, the 
control, especially of the Spratlys, has been in dispute by China and several 
Southeast Asian countries, especially Vietnam, in the mid-20th century onwards.  
It is one of the busiest maritime shipping routes and it witnesses one-
fourth of the world's crude oil and oil products transported through its waters. The 
South China Sea is rich in natural resources. There are minerals, natural gas, 
and oil deposits on the islands and the seafloor. For this reason, at the end of the 
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1970’s, countries around the South China Sea area declared their sovereignties 
over all or part, one after another, and then the dispute emerged. In 1995, when 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) came into effect, this 
dispute suddenly became a hot topic. Today, the South China Sea, which 
includes the Paracel and Spratly Archipelagos and the Natuna Island group, is 
the most volatile flashpoint in Southeast Asia. Mainland China, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei all claim control over part or the entire 
archipelago. 
The sensitivity and instability of relations in the South China Sea is evident 
when considering recent activities by China. On July 17, 2004, the PRC began a 
week-long war game simulating an invasion of Taiwan. The exercise was 
conducted on Dongshan Island and involved over 18,000 troops, sea and air 
assets.  [Ref. 23] 
B. WARGAME SCENARIO 
The scenario used for the wargame takes place in the year 2016. In this 
scenario, China has continued a rapid economic growth and used the funds from 
its growing economy to enhance education, social programs, and military forces. 
The military funding focused on strategic and naval forces capable of 
establishing larger force projection range from its shores. The scenario depicts a 
treaty being signed by Taiwan and China to establish unification by the year 
2018. 
Control of the South China Sea was seen as a strategic necessity by the 
PRC (Peoples Republic of China). The off shore oil reserves were claimed as a 
result of the increased naval forces and consequently in 2015 China publicly 
claimed hegemony over the entire South China Sea. Later the same year, the 
PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) and the PRC Navy reinforced its presence in the 
Spratley Islands.  A number of military enhancements were made on the islands 
to include runways, pier and maintenance facilities, Air Defense sites, and 
surface to surface ballistic missile sites. These actions were condemned by the 
United States, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Japan 
but no consensus on a response could be mustered.  A hasty common defense 
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treaty from the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines was 
established as a response for this aggressive behavior, but was disregarded by 
China. 
Throughout 2015 China continued to build on its military presence in the 
South China Sea despite numerous protests. Tensions climaxed in 2016 when a 
Philippine jet aircraft strafed a Chinese destroyer during live fire exercises two 
miles off the Palawan Islands coast. The incident resulted in the loss of ten 
Chinese sailors. The destroyer returned fire but failed to hit the Philippine aircraft. 
This incident spawned a new agenda for the Chinese. The PRC claimed 
that they now had a reason to establish a “safety” perimeter around the South 
China Sea. The Chinese saw that establishing a perimeter required the invasion 
of Kepulalian Natuna (Indonesia).  The island was taken by force and was 
controlled by a division of PLA supported by an air defense regiment, ten surface 
to surface missile batteries, and ten shore to ship missile batteries.  Nations 
within the South China Sea region were threatened to disregard and not react to 
the actions taken against Kepulalian Natuna.  Doing so would result in the 
invasion of Palawan. To reinforce this threat the PRC Navy set up quarantine on 
Puerta Princesa port, Palawan. The PRC government was now in position to 
dictate a new order in the South China Sea region and did so with a treaty 
between Philipines and Indonesia. The treaty resulted in the New Era of South 
China Sea Cooperation among perimeter nations. 
The United States and other supporting nations condemned the actions by 
China and submitted a joint United Nations resolution to establish sanctions 
against the PRC. The resolution did not stand and was vetoed by the Security 
Council. This led the United States National Command Authority, through the 
Secretary of Defense, to establish a Combined JTF (Joint Task Force) with 
Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Australia. The mission of the JTF was to 
prepare alternative courses of action to deter Chinese aggression and protect 
Philippine and Indonesian sovereignty.  Additionally, the CJTF commander 
should be prepared to repel invasion of Palawan Island with follow-up operations 
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to re-establish Indonesian sovereignty over Kepulalian Natuna without any 
strikes of the Chinese mainland or Taiwan. 
C. ANALYSIS SCENARIO 
The analytical section of this thesis focused a portion of the scenario used 
for the wargame.  The actual wargame analysis covered several weeks time and 
the entire South China Sea area.  The constructive simulation conducted with 
POA 2 is focused on a decisive battle on the island of Palawan, specifically the 
battle for Puerto Princessa.  The island of Palawan’s strategic strength is its main 
sea port and its airport.  Both of these are located on the southern side of the 
island in the vicinity of the city of Puerto Princessa.  The US forces understood 
that a military invasion of the island of Palawan would require immediate control 
of these strategic points and focused their invasion on gaining an immediate 
foothold in and around Puerto Princessa. 
The scenario begins with Chinese forces emplacing slightly over a 
brigade’s worth of infantry forces and a company size element of armor forces 
around the northern outskirts of the city of Puerto Princessa.  Additional infantry 
forces were located within the city and around the port.  The entire city (the port 
and its surrounding waters) and the airport are all covered by artillery support 
from over a battalion’s worth of artillery and an air defense battery that has 
surface to air missiles that can range over the entire island.  Chinese forces exist 
elsewhere on the island but are not involved in this fight. 
The US forces have established a foothold in their effort to gain control of 
the island and its strategic assets.  It was determined that a direct amphibious 
assault near or on the port of Puerto Princessa would be too costly in both 
personnel and equipment.  In an effort to minimize casualties the US forces 
conducted amphibious operations on the south coast of the island about 20 
kilometers to the west of Puerto Princessa, in the vicinity of the city of Inagawan.  
A rapidly moving Marine task force consisting of 2 battalions of wheeled infantry, 
a company size tank element, with artillery and air defense batteries in support, 
executed this mission.  An additional medium range rocket unit was placed at on 
the northern coast of the island about 30 kilometers northwest of Puerto 
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Princessa.  The importance of this unit will be revealed when the AJCN is 
incorporated in the scenario.  A U.S. aircraft carrier located off the southern coast 
of Palawan provided Close Air Support (CAS).  Two F-18 Super Hornets were 
sortied from the carrier to provide continuous coverage of the  Marine task force. 
The US forces begin movement eastward towards Puerto Princessa upon 
establishment of a beachhead.  A tank company leads the forces with the infantry 
forces following.  The artillery and air defense forces bound forward in order to 
maintain their support to the combat units.  Due to the very restricted terrain, the 
routes initially used by the US forces are along the coastal road network on the 
southern edge of Palawan.  This scenario will be conducted with various 
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IV. WARGAME 
A. WHAT IS A WARGAME? 
 "A wargame is a warfare model or simulation whose operation does not 
involve the activities of actual military forces, and whose sequence of events 
affects and is, in turn, affected by the decisions made by players representing the 
opposite sides." [Ref. 7, 164]  As stated by Perla, "ultimately, the goal of all war 
game design is communication." [Ref. 7, 185]  This communication aims to show 
the analyst, commander, or staff officer a possible cause and effect relationship 
between the battlefield systems and the course of action used to employ those 
systems.   
 A wargame is comprised of several elements, which build upon one 
another to provide the user an educational experience.  The most important 
element is human decision making.  This facet of wargaming separates it from 
strict simulation, where "decisions" are based on preset algorithms in a computer 
program.  Other essential elements of a "good wargame" are:  objectives, a 
scenario, a database, models, rules, players, and analysis. [Ref. 7, 165]  These 
elements generate the platform for the players to achieve their goal for the 
wargame.   
 The use of wargames spans a wide spectrum. [Ref. 7, 165]  Wargames 
can be used for education, entertainment, to exercise detailed war plans prior to 
a deployment, or to exercise new systems to identify weaknesses in design in an 
effort to compliment the design process.  This thesis aims to use the later 
employment of a wargame as the AJCN is employed in a Joint Force scenario to 
generate insight into its employment as a combat multiplier and aid in the 
development of the AJCN's CONOPS.   
B. USE OF WARGAMING AS A CONOPS DEVELOPMENT TOOL 
 Generating an accurate picture of the battlefield is essential to the success 
of an operation.  This thought is echoed by Sun Tzu, who describes this truth in 
the following manner,  
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…to estimate the enemy situation and to calculate distances and 
the degree of difficulty of the terrain so as to control victory are 
virtues of the superior general.  He who fights with full knowledge of 
these factors is certain to win; he who does not will surely be 
defeated. [Ref. 9] 
The development of a concept of operations for a system's or unit's 
employment using wargaming parallels the use of wargaming by battle staffs to 
develop plans and orders.  United States Army Field Manual 101-5, Staff 
Organization and Operations, Final Draft 1996, defines wargaming as; 
…a disciplined process with rules and steps which attempts to 
visualize the flow of a battle, given friendly dispositions, strengths, 
and weaknesses; enemy assets and probable COAs; and the 
characteristics of area of operations. [Ref. 10] 
Here we seek to visualize the employment of the AJCN and its effects on 
the outcome of the battle.  Several aspects of a wargame require attention and 
care to ensure that conclusions drawn from the wargame are taken in context.  
Perla addresses several of these issues in his book, The Art of Wargaming: 
…wargaming is not analysis…It is not a technique for producing a 
rigorous, quantitative or logical dissection of a problem or for 
defining precise measures of effectiveness by which to compare 
alternative solutions.  A wargame is not duplicable.  A wargame is a 
warfare model whose sequence of events is affected by the 
decisions made by players representing the opposing sides.  [Ref. 
7, 164] 
The use of wargame outputs is quite similar between the battle staff 
generating an Operational Plant (OPLAN) and the development of a CONOPS.  
Both use the insights gleaned from the wargame as a foundation for planning the 
employment of forces or systems.  The characteristics of a wargame, as noted 
above, must be considered with great regard as plans or CONOPS are 
developed.  The wargame represents a snapshot in time, with a specific set of 
individuals with particular backgrounds placed in a particular scenario resulting in 
specific decisions that are unrepeatable.  The output of the wargame must be 
taken for what it is and not a quantifiable resource upon which to base significant 
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decisions, but rather to offer an analytical check on decisions made or decisions 
in the process of being made. 
The most appropriate term for the output of a wargame is "insight".  
"Insight" gained through a wargame takes on the form of any of the following: 
 Effective use of a unit/system in a particular situation 
 Actions of the enemy not previously considered 
 Plausible friendly actions not previously considered 
 Logistical issues connected to the plan or its branches 
 Requirements of support from higher echelons not previously 
addressed 
 Redundancy of effort (ability to shift forces to maximize their effect 
on the enemy) and many others 
This thesis used a wargame to gain insight into the employment of the 
AJCN and generate insight on its employment from the perspective of how the 
battle staff employs the AJCN and how the enemy reacts to the system.  These 
insights are presented in an Issue/Recommendation format in a later section. 
C. WARGAME EXECUTION 
 The wargame was conducted in the context of the Wargaming course, 
OA4604, offered at the Naval Postgraduate School, during the Fall Quarter 2003.  
The primary objective for the Wargaming course's wargame was the exposure of 
mid-grade officers to the use of wargaming as a tool used in the Military Decision 
Making Process.   
 Officers from three services and five nations, Army, Navy, and Marine, 
were selected to take on the role of the various staff positions normally 
associated with a Joint Planning Staff.  Staff positions were filled for both the 
"friendly" and "enemy" forces.  The staffs separated to generate their respective 
courses of actions, which were wargamed in an "open" forum, as described in 
the Methodology section, using analog techniques to generate combat losses.   
Upon the finalization of the two sides' courses of action, the two forces were 
arrayed in the digital constructive simulation platform, JCATS, for a "closed" 
wargame.   
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 JCATS was used as a platform to accommodate adjudication of the 
interactions of the two opposing forces.  There were no "automatic" algorithms 
engaged that would allow any of the forces to move without being directed by the 
players.  The officers on each team were trained on how to employ their forces in 
JCATS.  The number of students in the course required that most of the "staff" 
take on the additional role of "pucker", while the two commanders and their 
respective executive officers were able to track the battle from their maps.  
 The "simulation center" provided separate "rooms" for the two sides to 
conduct their operations in isolation.  Numerous computer terminals were 
available in each room, controlling a portion of the friendly or enemy forces 
respectively.  Terminal operators could only "see" the units that they controlled 
and the units, friendly or enemy, that his combat systems "saw" based on their 
individual line of sight or radar/sensor capability.  The "friendly" and "enemy" 
commanders each had an area within their respective rooms to maintain and 
update their situational map to facilitate making decisions based on the 
developing situation. 
 The workstation controllers were assigned to their workstations, which 
controlled a set portion of the friendly or enemy forces.  Forces were arrayed 
based on their planned positions from the course of action decided upon by the 
respective sides.  Once the forces were arrayed the game-clock was started and 
the battle ensued.  The insights gained during this wargame were not quantitative 
with respect to the number of enemy or friendly killed, but more on the conduct of 
the commanders and their staffs and how they employed the AJCN and their 
reactions to the situational awareness that it provided.  The following section 





A. WHAT IS A CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATION? 
The definition of simulation is divided into three categories.  They are 
defined as follows by the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO): 
Live, Virtual, and Constructive Simulation 
A broadly used taxonomy for classifying simulation types, the 
categorization of simulation into live, virtual, and constructive, is problematic 
because there is no clear division between these categories. The degree of 
human participation in the simulation is infinitely variable, as is the degree of 
equipment realism. The categorization of simulations also suffers by excluding a 
category for simulated people working real equipment (e.g., smart vehicles).  
Live Simulation: A simulation involving real people operating real systems.  
Virtual Simulation: A simulation involving real people operating simulated 
systems. Virtual simulations inject human-in-the-loop in a central role by 
exercising motor control skills (e.g., flying an airplane), decision skills (e.g., 
committing fire control resources to action), or communication skills (e.g., as 
members of a C4I team).  
Constructive Model or Simulation: Models and simulations that involve 
simulated people operating simulated systems. Real people stimulate (make 
inputs) to such simulations, but are not involved in determining the outcomes. 
[Ref. 11 and Ref. 12]  The definition of simulation, as defined by DMSO, also 
supports the Joint Concept of Operation as set forth by Joint Capabilities and 
Integration Development System (JCIDS). All three types of simulations can be 
used in CONOPS development. The decision on the type of simulation to be 
used is driven by the mission, the requirements, and the technology available. 
For the purposes set forth in this thesis we will use constructive simulations to 




B. USE OF SIMULATION AS A CONOPS DEVELOPMENT TOOL 
Designing combat systems for the 21st Century is becoming increasingly 
complex.  They are characterized by including much more information and 
serving many more purposes than previous systems.  Additionally, these combat 
systems are no longer viewed as final designs when issued to the intended user.  
Rather, they are required to evolve and adapt to ever-changing battlefield 
requirements.  This shift towards designing systems that can be evolved to the 
future battlefield requires a non-traditional approach to establishing system 
requirements.  This chapter discusses how simulations can aid in CONOPS 
development. 
The term CONOPS is used throughout industry and the military.  The 
definitions vary for the specific application.  Only within the armed forces are the 
definitions uniform as to what exactly is a CONOPS.  
Various Definitions of Concept of Operations: 
US Dept of Homeland Security:  Document detailing the method, act, 
process, or effect of using an Information System. [Ref. 29] 
US Army:  A graphic, verbal, or written statement in broad outline that 
gives an overall picture of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an 
operation or series of operations; includes at a minimum the scheme of 
maneuver and the fire support plan.  The concept of operations is embodied in 
campaign plans and operation plans particularly when the plans cover a series of 
connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession.  It is 
described in sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to 
understand what they are to do and how to fight the battle without further 
instructions. [Ref. 30] 
US Navy:  A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a 
commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of 
operations.  The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans 
and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series 
of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession.  The 
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concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included 
primarily for additional clarity of purpose.  Also called a commanders concept. 
[Ref. 13]  
The definitions presented in here do not clearly match the meaning of 
CONOPS as it applies to the representation of new and evolving systems in 
modeling and simulation.  For the uses of modeling and simulation a CONOPS is 
best described as a narrative discussion of how a system is intended to operate.  
In its intended environment it is written from multiple perspectives and captures 
all aspects of the systems operation.  Additionally, it captures both short-term 
and long-term operational aspects of systems in a joint environment.  A 
successful system CONOPS is one that can be used to quickly provide 
warfighters with a comprehensive overview of the system and how it functions in 
a joint environment. 
CONOPS as it is defined here supports the Joint Concept of Operations 
set forth in JCIDS.  It provides a way to describe how all components work 
together in a joint environment. 
Using simulations to develop CONOPS in the military dates back to the 
cold war, during this era the DoD began using computer simulations to analyze 
course of action development.  Computer simulations such as the Concepts 
Evaluation Model (CEM) were utilized to gain insight towards CONOPS 
development for possible NATO-Warsaw Pact combat in Europe (Warfare 
Modeling, MORS).  Since the early 1990’s simulations have been widely used in 
the development of both CONOPS and new systems.  During this time frame 
technology has evolved at such a rapid pace that the DoD realigned many of it’s 
Model and Simulation Organizations to better support the modern battlefield 
requirements. [Ref. 14]  
The DoD has recently put forth a great deal of effort to integrate CONOPS 
development and simulations.  In 1997 a major DOD initiative designed to 
improve the acquisition process was set forth.  This process is called Simulation, 
Test and Evaluation Process (STEP).  STEP integrated Modeling and Simulation 
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(M&S) with Test and Evaluation (T&E).  The process is intended to provide early 
and continuous information to the joint military worth of a system so that the total 
life cycle is more effective and efficient. All this is to be done through 
incorporating M&S with T&E. [Ref. 15] 
This process provided a catalyst for incorporating simulations into systems 
acquisitions.  Since STEP, additional efforts have been set forth to further 
enhance system development in the joint military.  These efforts further support 
the use of simulations as a tool for joint systems development. 
As the joint force becomes more integrated and interdependent, a 
coordinated process is required to define how the joint force operates and how 
new capabilities are identified and developed.  JCIDS establishes new methods 
for generating system requirements.  JCIDS implements an integrated, 
collaborative process, based on top-level strategic direction, to guide 
development of new capabilities through changes in doctrine, organization, 
material, training & education, leadership, personnel, and/or facilities.  The 
difference from JCIDS and the past processes is in the requirements 
development structure.  The previous methods for system requirements allowed 
systems to be developed in isolated environments (i.e. Army, Navy, etc) and 
subsequently deconflicted at the joint level.  The JCIDS methodology flows from 
a top down architecture or top down requirements born at joint level.  This top 
down process translates into the Joint Concept of Operations.  An implication of 
this process is that simulations once conducted in the T&E stages of systems 
acquisition will now be required at the beginning stages of acquisition. [Ref. 16] 
The Joint Concept of Operations establishes processes for component 
services to plan and develop systems to work in collaboration on the Joint 
Battlefield Environment.  A method for doing this is Concept of Operations 
development using simulation. 
No step-by-step method for developing CONOPS through Simulation is 
set as a standard throughout any of the DoD.  Based on Test and Evaluation 
procedures, acquisition procedures, and examining previous CONOPS 
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development procedures we have diagramed how a CONOPS development 
using a constructive simulation might look.  This diagram (Figure 6) describes 
where simulations may best be used in the process of the development.  The 
Mission Analysis uses the Mission Tasks derived from the training requirements 
and the system objectives derived from the Operational Requirements Document 
(ORD) and the user’s Concept of Operations to define the total set of 
requirements for the system.  Through the integration of the Mission Tasks, 
Training Requirements and the Engineering Requirements a Constructive 
Simulation Model is built to provide insight and helps define the Detailed 
Requirements to the CONOPS.  
 


















































The methodology put forth in Figure 5 is based a model put forth by Dr. 
Jim Stevens, Director, Joint Data Support, OSD PA&E.  It is not to be thought of 
as a total solution, but as a starting point for developing an approved 
methodology that would support development and acquisitions procedures as put 
forth in the Joint Concept of Operations. 
C. JCATS MODEL 
The Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) is a computer-based 
combat simulation program developed by the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory.  "The program is currently used for training both individuals and 
command staffs in tactics and deployment of resources, analyzing the 
effectiveness of weapons and different force structures, and planning and 
rehearsing missions." [Ref. 20]   
JCATS is a constructive simulation that can accommodate the simulation 
of a broad spectrum of operations.  The two main audiences of this model are the 
training and analytical communities.  The model accommodates both audiences 
through a number of tools that provide the user with ability to generate and 
execute a scenario with a user-defined level of detail.  This thesis aimed to use 
the model in both modes, for training and analysis. 
JCATS provides the trainer with an interactive model that allows the users 
to control the actions of every entity on the simulated battlefield.  This "human-in-
the loop" mode of execution allows for the adjustment of plans based on "enemy" 
actions and the interjection of more "realistic" actions of entities upon making 
contact with "enemy" units.  Entities can be aggregated into "unit" sized elements 
to allow for ease of "road march" type movement and can then be deaggregated 
upon nearing contact with "enemy" units to allow for the manipulation of lower 
level units to engage the "enemy" in a more tactical manner instead of acting as 
one large unit in a formation.  This flexibility the level of scenario detail provides 
the capability to accommodate training audiences of various levels in an 
organization.  Audiences can range from an individual attempting to gain insight  
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into the best way to enter a building given a set enemy disposition to a Brigade 
level staff needing to exercise their planning process or generate insights during 
a Course of Action Analysis.   
JCATS also provides the analyst with a platform to test new equipment, try 
new methods of employing units, and answer a myriad of other questions.  Once 
a scenario is built, the analyst has the capability to "program" the movements of 
all the entities on the battlefield to accommodate a "closed loop run."  The model 
can collect many types of data during the runs for later analysis.  Multiple runs 
may be conducted using the "batch run" option to execute any specified number 
of runs of the scenario to generate the data required for statistical analysis.  
Upon completion of the runs, the data can be viewed with the Analyst Work 
Station (AWS).  The AWS provides a means to view the collected data in either 
its raw or summary format and a selection of graphical representations of the 
data.  Below are a sample of reports that are available to the analyst. 
 
   
Figure 7.   "All Kills" Summary Report:  Detailed report of shooter-target pairs sorted 




























Figure 9.   "Direct Fire Ranges (Missed)":  Graphical summary of shots that were 






Figure 10.   "Forces Remaining":  Graphical representation of "friendly" and "enemy" 
forces levels based on the percent remaining over time 
 
A major strength of the JCATS model is in its database tool, Vista.  The 
Vista interface provides the user the ability to enter numerous levels of data that 
describes its interaction with other entities in the scenario.  Figure 11 below 
shows one menu of Vista's graphical user interface (GUI) as an example of the 
amount of detail the user can incorporate into the scenario's entities.   
 
Figure 11.   JCATS VISTA Editor   
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The user's ability to access the model's database through Vista provides 
the ability to model a scenario at any level of detail required.  The details of the 
probability of hit (PH) and probability of kill (PK) can be adjusted to achieve a 
"good idea" of the outcome of a particular engagement or a precise modeling of a 












Figure 12.   PhPk Curve Assignment Editor:  Links the munition and its target with a 
Ph and Pk curve 
 
JCATS bridges the gap between the training and analytical modeling 
communities with tools that accommodate both aspects of modeling and 
simulation.  This tool was chosen for this thesis based on its ability to remain a 
constant variable in the generation of results from both a "human-in-the-loop" 
wargame and "closed loop" analytical runs of the scenario. 
D. MODELING THE AJCN IN JCATS 
The modeling of the AJCN in JCATS took on two different aspects, one for 
a "human in the loop" experiment and one for "closed loop runs".  The two 
different levels of incorporating human involvement allow for both subjective and 
analytical evaluation of the system with respect to its employment.  The human in 
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the loop run provides insight into possible issues involved with the human aspect 
of employing a system based on previous experience and mindsets.  The "closed 
loop runs" allows for several variations to be "played out" in a scenario to provide 
insight on the possible methods of employing the system.  The modeling of the 
AJCN system is inherently singular to the two modes described above.  Both 
methods are described in detail below with respect to how the AJCN was 
modeled.  The insights gained from the two methods are discussed in the 
Simulation Results and Analysis portion of this thesis. 
1. Human in the Loop (Wargame) 
The modeling of the AJCN in JCATS for the "human in the loop" run was 
based upon the physical set up of the wargaming lab in which the experiment 
was conducted and the parameters in JCATS required to provide the user with 
the "intelligence" provided by the AJCN's capabilities.   
a. Waveform Bridging 
The wargaming lab provided the physical capability of the players 
to interact in such a manner as to model the waveform bridging capabilities of the 
AJCN.  Those individuals that were under the AJCN's blanket of coverage could 
speak to one another and inform each other of enemy contact.  The inherent 
ability to communicate "up the chain of command" was also enabled through the 
acting commander being able to oversee the operation from his perspective at 
the map, which was updated with intelligence from the various workstations.  
Thus, the waveform bridging capability modeling in JCATS was not required. 
b. SIGINT 
The AJCN nodes were modeled as "regular" UAVs with respect to 
the sensors mounted on a UAV allowing for LOS contacts to be made at an 
appropriate range for both air and land-based enemy systems.  During the 
course of a JCATS run, the personnel at a particular workstation only see the 
"friendly" units set up on that workstation.  The only time an enemy (or other 
friendly unit not controlled by that workstation) unit will appear on the screen is if 
one of the systems on the workstation has a LOS to that unit and the sensors 
inherent to the friendly system can range the enemy system.   
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The AJCN's SIGINT capability was modeled by this display of units 
on the respective workstations, representing the generation of enemy (and 
friendly) situational awareness based on the AJCN's extensive range capabilities.  
Upon gaining "contact" with the enemy units, the information was "transmitted" to 
other units in the area either through the chain of command via the waveform 
capabilities of the AJCN modeled as previously mentioned.   
c. Jamming 
Jamming was not incorporated into the Human in the Loop run. 
2. JCATS - Closed Loop Runs 
The modeling of the AJCN in JCATS during "closed loop runs" required 
the gross representation of the AJCN's most combat effectiveness enhancing 
capabilities.  Given the capabilities and limitations of the JCATS model, modeling 
the AJCN included the capabilities of SIGINT, jamming, and waveform bridging.  
The methods used to model the AJCN stemmed from the need for the system to 
incur a quantifiable difference in the outcome of a battle, namely the relative 
amount of attrition to the enemy and friendly forces.  The actual methods of 
modeling these capabilities and their mapping back to the actual AJCN 
capabilities are fully explained in the following paragraphs. 
a. Waveform Bridging and SIGINT 
Waveform bridging and SIGINT were combined since they primarily 
serve to enhance the situational awareness of the units that receive information 
updates from the AJCN in theater.  Since JCATS does not yet incorporate 
autonomous agent behavior or model communication between entities, the 
appropriate responses of units to "enhanced situational awareness" were 
restricted to those cause-effect relationships inherent to the JCATS model.  The 
most applicable relationship that would result in measurable effects on the 
"virtual battlefield" was the Forward Observer to Direct Support element 
relationship.   
The AJCN "nodes" were given range of coverage based on the 
capability parameters of the supporting platform.  The AJCN were set up to 
provide Forward Observer support.  In JCATS, an entity that is Forward Observer 
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capable will provide Calls For Fire to any indirect munitions system in its same 
unit that is set up to provide Direct Support (DS) for indirect fires.  The AJCNs' 
ability to act as a Forward Observer in JCATS maps to the AJCN's real 
capabilities in the following manner:   
1. SIGINT provides units enemy unit location information that can 
be used for targeting by indirect fire systems.   
 
2. Waveform bridging allows all units, regardless of communication 
system, the ability to obtain the intelligence updates of enemy 
location and activity. 
The sequence of events in JCATS occurred in the following 
manner:   
1. The AJCN moves along its designated route. 
 
2. The AJCN SIGINT "sensors" make contact with enemy units. 
 
3. A Call For Fire is sent to all DS artillery units on the friendly 
side. 
 
4. Those friendly artillery units within range of the enemy unit 
initiate their firing sequence.   
The tangible result of modeling in this manner is the number of 
enemy units killed.  Although the engagement of enemy units may not always be 
the result of information gained through SIGINT and the cross-talk between units 
enabled by waveform bridging; for a closed loop run, the number of enemy units 
killed provides a measure of effectiveness for the AJCN's capabilities. 
During initial experimental runs, this method of modeling was 
successful.  Artillery units that were within range and had applicable target 







 Figure 13.   Initial Array of Forces for "Closed-Loop" Scenario 
 
 
b. Electronic Warfare (EW) 
The electronic warfare capability of the AJCN was also modeled 
using the FO capability provided by JCATS.  The EW aspect of "jamming" enemy 
radio frequency was achieved through the analogy that when a platform's 
communication systems are "jammed" and not afforded the capability to 
communication with other friendly units, it is effectively "suppressed." 
In JCATS, when an entity is suppressed by artillery it will stop until 
the artillery barrage has stopped.  It will then continue on its prescribed route.  
This maps to the idea that a platform whose communications systems are being 
jammed loses its situational awareness and ability to effectively maneuver and 
fight with its parent unit.  The platform will tend to stop and regroup to shift its 
40 
means of communicating with its parent unit to some analog means of 
communication or wait until the jamming ceases.  
To achieve the suppressive "jamming", the AJCN entity was given 
a direct fire weapon with High Explosive (HE) munitions with a Probability of Hit = 
100% and a Probability of Kill (PK) = 0% that could be "called for fire" by its FO.  
The PH/PK combination means that the AJCN's jamming "weapon system" will 
hit whatever it fires at, but will not cause any physical damage to the engaged 
system.  In JCATS, the effect of a PK of 0% is suppression.  The AJCN would 
"call itself for fire" and send a barrage of "jamming signals" at the enemy entity, 
thereby suppressing the enemy and stopping its movement.  The AJCN was 
given a very large number of "munitions" so the jamming would continue until the 
enemy left the AJCN's cone of influence.   
 
Figure 14.   AJCN sending off a "jamming signal" to a targeted enemy system 
 
During initial experimental runs this configuration was successful, 
with the caveat that the AJCN would "jam" only one enemy entity at a time.  This 
occurred due to the JCATS algorithm for artillery pieces that dictates that once a 
fire mission is called, it will continue until either the target is destroyed or the 
firing unit has expended all its ammunition.  Once the AJCN's flight path moved 
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its cone of influence out of range of the particular enemy entity it was "jamming", 
it would shift to "jamming" a new enemy entity.   
3. One-Tier versus Three-Tier 
Due to the organizational set up of JCATS, only one tier was evaluated 
during the experimental executions.  This impeded our ability to comment on the 
self-healing network aspect of having three different tiers of AJCN operation 
within a theater of operations.  However, once the bottom-tier is evaluated on its 
effect on the battle scenario outcome, the number of middle- and top-tier AJCN 
can be extrapolated to generate a possible number and disposition of the various 
tier-levels of AJCN. 
4. Experimental JCATS Executions 
The runs were to be executed in groups of 30 to accommodate statistical 
significance in the results and allow a comparative analysis of the results.  The 
description of the runs follows:   
BASELINE:  No AJCN systems incorporated 
AJCN_1-6:  A series of six scenarios with between one and six AJCNs 
assigned to a Division-sized unit respectively. 
5. Database Confound 
During the course of experimenting with the AJCN's capabilities in JCATS, 
as previously mentioned, it was determined that the database that was made 
available did not have the detail required for the conduct of the analytical portion 
of this thesis.  The lack of required detail involved many facets of the database:  
Ph/Pk values, target pairings, sensor characteristics, and others.   
The scenario detailed in Chapter Three of this thesis was of a magnitude 
that required a large number of "friendly" and "enemy" systems, weapons, 
munitions, and sensors.  The generation of an acceptable database for these 
elements and their interactions would require a significant amount of time (on the 
order of man years) and effort that was beyond the scope of this thesis and the 
time available.  To our knowledge there was not another database available that 
addressed the issues mentioned above for the systems required for this analysis.   
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The following paragraphs give some of the problem areas we encountered 
and a brief overview of the process of generating a system in JCATS.  A 
"system" is comprised of four main components: a platform, a weapon, a 
munition, and a sensor.  A platform may have multiple weapons mounted on it 
(i.e. an M1A2 may have both the 120mm main gun and a .50 caliber machine 
gun), which can fire multiple munitions (i.e. 120mm HE, 120mm HP, etc), and 
may have multiple sensors available to the platform (i.e. binoculars, night vision 
sights, etc).  Each component of the system must be detailed in the database, 
beginning with the munition. 
The munition editor in JCATS requires that detailed data relating to the 
munition's capabilities be input.  Information required includes: munition type, 
munition reliability, minimum and maximum range, velocity, time of flight at 
different ranges, suppression effects on targeted vehicles, and many others.  
This detail enhances the simulation's ability to effectively and precisely adjudicate 
the effects of the munition on a target.  Below are some examples of input 






Figure 15.   Munition Editor-General: User designates the munition type, fire modes, 


















Figure 16.   Munition Editor-Conventional: User designates guidance type,             
ranges, and munition velocity 
 
The critical step in developing munitions is the generation of Ph/Pk tables.  
These tables describe the effect of each munition against a particular target, 
commonly referred to as a "target pairing".  The detail and relative accuracy of 
this data will determine the level of "realism" portrayed in the simulation.  
Particular attention must be given to all possible targets for each munition.  If a 
target pairing does not exist for a particular munition and target, the platform 
carrying the munition will not engage the target even if it would in a "real world" 
situation.  We learned that there were problems with most of the weapon 
systems’ Ph/Pk tables.  Correcting this would have taken considerable time to 










itor and Ph and Pk Table Examples 
 
the target groups and shows which are 
munitions not "paired" with a target 
pairings in our scenario were incomplete, thus hindering our ability to simulate a 
battlefield with appropriate engagements between forces.   
 
Figure 17.   PhPk Curve Assignment Ed
 
JCATS does provide a useful t
generated.  The PhPk Curve Assignm
shows the format PhPk Curve Assignment Editor.  We discovered that target 
ool to check if all target pairings have been 
ent Editor shows all the munitions and all 
"paired".  As stated before, those 
group will not engage that target.  Figure 18 
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 Figure 18.   PhPk Curve Assignment Editor:  Munitions not "paired"                         
with a target will not engage that particular target,                                      
regardless of what might occur in the "real world" 
 
The weapon editor requires the user to define several operational 
parameters related to the use of the weapon.  These include setup time, lay time, 
minimum cycle time, reload time, and others.  The figure below (Fig 19) shows 
the input window in the weapon editor.   
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 Figure 19.   Weapon Editor:  Requires the user to define several operational 
parameters of the weapon 
 
Sensors can range from the human eye to an air-to-air radar (see Figure 20).  
The sensor editor requires the user to designate several parameters that define 























Figure 21.   Sensor Editor-Data input window requiring user to define several 
parameters describing the functionality of the sensor 
 
The system editor is the final step in generating a platform.  This editor 
brings all the previously mentioned pieces together on a platform that is 
generated within the context of several menued windows.  Figure 19 shows the 
"Stations" window that describes the platform's weapon and the munitions, by 
quantity, that the weapon will have available.  A sensor is also associated with 
the specific weapon.  As can be seen from Figure 22, the platform may have 
more than one station, which corresponds to a platform having more than one 
weapon system, each with their muntions and sensors.   
 
Figure 22.   System Editor: User defines the platform's characteristics, platform's 
weapons with their associated munitions and sensors 
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The difficulties in modeling the AJCN in JCATS are beyond the systems 
inadequacies in modeling C4I systems.  As previously stated, the programming 
of all entities and their attributes within the database is a very time consuming 
and labor intensive task.  Most database construction consumes a full staff for at 
least 6 months before completion. [Ref. 31] 
Due to the time required to build a suitable database we found it 
necessary to acquire an already constructed scenario in order to expedite our 
analysis.  After searching for a representative scenario and database, we finally 
found one that we could use and began detailing it to meet our needs.  Once we 
began modeling our scenario we noticed some peculiarities in our results.  Many 
of the systems within the JCATS were not engaging other systems at expected 
ranges nor were they displaying the proper effects.  The errors were determined 
to be database inadequacies.  Specifically, many of the probability of hit and 
probability of kill tables along with the pairing of systems were not well- 
constructed or did not exist.  We determined that we did not have the time to fix 
these errors so we decided to find another software system to handle the 
simulation portion of this thesis.  Over the period of three weeks we reviewed 
several other simulation packages and found that the data base construction 
would be the obstacle to get past for all of them but one, Point of Attack 2 (POA 
2).   
POA 2 had only been built for the military community as a research 
project.  It had been developed as a weapons simulation tool for the Air Force, 
but had not been used for any other simulations up to this point.  It had a 
database within the program that was very extensive and accurate.  It modeled 
numerous real world systems and allowed for easy creation of new systems, to  
include C4I systems.  Having only 3 months left to complete our work, it 
appeared that this new simulation package could model our scenario with 
enough accuracy to provide insight into the development of the CONOPS for the 
AJCN. 
Figure 23 shows a graph of the Ph data found in our JCATS database for 
a 40mm High Explosive round.  When compared with the POA 2 data for the 
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same ammunition in Figure 24, we see a level of detail and accuracy in the POA 
2 database that was not found in the JCATS database that we had available.  
After a thorough examination of the POA2 database as compared to the JCATS 
database, we decided to use POA2 for the closed loop simulation analysis of the 
AJCN. 
In the figures below we will look at one example of the differences found 
between the two models' databases.  We will look at a 40mm High Explosive 
round which is fired from a MK19 40mm Machine Gun.  For the purposes of this 
comparison we took used unclassified weapon and munition data available from 
the Military Analysis Network web site.  The 40mm has a maximum range of 
2200 meters and a maximum effective range of 1600 meters. [Ref. 32]  We now 
compare this data against the data represented by the JCATS and POA 2 Ph 
curves in Figures 23 and 24 respectively.   
The JCATS Ph curve, Figure 23, for the 40mm munition has several Ph 
values that account for ranges up to 2800 meters, well beyond even the 
maximum range of the munition.  The dramatic drop in Ph to below .50 between 
0 to 500 meters is a significant misrepresentation of the munition given that its 
maximum effective range is 1600 meters.  Although we were not able to access 
the Ph data for the 40mm munition, it would be reasonable to assume that the 
maximum effective range should generate at least a .50 Ph against a target. It 
should be reiterated that this discrepancy with the munition Ph values does not 
reflect poorly on the JCATS model itself, only the database we had available.  
The POA 2 ammunition properties screen, Figure 23, for a 40mm High 
Explosive round shows quite a different view of the munition's capabilities.  The 
"Accuracy vs. Range" portion of Figure 23 represents the varying Ph for the 
munition between 0 and 1800 meters.  This range span correlates well with the 
maximum effective range of 1600 meters.  After comparing many Ph/Pk tables 
and graphs between the two databases, we determined that the database made 




























Figure 24.   PThis JCATS Ph graph portrays that even under
the most favorable conditions the Ph for the
40mm round at its max effective range of 1600
meters has a probability of hit less than 10%.
Additionally, at 800 meters the munitions Ph is
only 30%.  
           
   JCATS Ph Curve Data for 40mm Munition 
This POA 2 Ph graph demonstrates an
unclassified but more accurate  Ph for the
40mm round. At its max effective range of
1600 meters it shows a probability of hit
of 40%.  At 900 meters the munitions Ph
is approximately 90%. A much more
realistic solution. 
OA2 Ammunition Properties for 40mm Munition 
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It should be noted that the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is currently 
spearheading a "JCATS Standard Database Initiative" which will alleviate many 
of the issues that surfaced during the conduct of this thesis.  The initiative will 
create an unclassified database comprised of vehicle, weapon, and munition 
parametric data that "would be used as a base line for simulation events." [Ref. 
21]  The military systems portion of the standard database is currently slated for 
completion June 2005.   
E. POA 2 MODEL 
The Point of Attack 2 (POA 2) software wargaming package is a physics-
based conflict simulation model produced by HPS simulations in partnership with 
the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFSOR).  The intent for POA 2 was 
to develop a weapon system evaluation tool for acquisition and modification of 
new or current weapon systems. [Ref. 25] 
POA 2 provides an interactive, high resolution, entity-level, conflict 
simulation that models two sided ground combat with limited air/naval operations 
on a user defined hexagonal or square digital terrain map.  POA 2 models both 
aggregate and individual systems.  It provides users with the capability to detail 
the replication of small group and individual activities all the way up to theater 
level operations. 
Features include: 
 Highly detailed and comprehensive 
 Tactically oriented 
 Extremely flexible 
 User customizable 
 Zero(computer vs computer), one or two operators 
 Uses and Applications include: 
 Training and Exercises 
 Analysis and experimentation 
 Mission Planning and Rehearsals 
 Wargaming 
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POA 2 can simulate hundreds of individual elements.  It can operate on a 
windows-based workstation or a laptop computer.  It typically simulates battle 
between two opposing sides (often called red and blue forces), but 
accommodates neutral relationships such as those of civilians.  Depending on 
the parameters established for the conflict, an entity's posture and actions can be 
varied as the operator desires.  Simulation operators see the actions of both 
forces and are able to view whatever intelligence is acquired about opposing 
forces via a windowed output screen called the Combat Phase Report, see 
Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25.   Combat Phase Report 
 
POA 2 is executed as a turn-based simulation.  It is not dynamic.  Each 
operator defines its unit parameters and goals and then, after the simulation is 
initiated, the operators take turns and adjust their forces as the simulation 
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continues.  In a computer versus computer simulation (known as AI versus AI, AI 
for Artificial Intelligence), the simulation uses the information acquired in each 
turn to make plans or orders for following turns.  For the purposes of our 
experiment both sides use AI.  Some parameters for the AI, such as morale, 
have adjustability during the set up of a scenario.  The adjustment of parameters 
such as morale all affect how the entities react with each other during the course 
of a simulation.  In AI mode no two game results will be exactly the same, 
although the results will generally follow the same pattern.  For example, a single 
scenario run 2 different times will usually produce similar outcomes but the force 
exchange ratios will be different.  The AI requires an initial value also known as a 
“seed” to begin its execution.  POA 2 uses a pseudo random number generator 
algorithm to determine this seed value.  Although this type of random number 
generator is considered to not be truly random, such as rolling a dice, it is broadly 
used in simulations and proved to produce consistent results for our application. 
[Ref. 26] 
The duration of games may vary from a few minutes for a brief exercise to 
hours for a complex simulation involving many units and entities.  Selected 
shorter scenarios may be run several times so that statistical analysis can be 
used to evaluate a particular tactic or weapon system as in this thesis. 
Time required to set up a POA 2 exercise varies depending on the number 
and kinds of combat forces and, especially, the kinds of topography to be 
modeled. Terrain can be modeled with extraordinary fidelity.  Rivers, for example, 
can be characterized by their current, depth, and underwater obstacles. Terrain 
data can be entered or imported, including correct elevation and geographical 
features, from another terrain editing software program titled ADC 2 (Aide de 
Camp 2). [Ref. 27] 
The detail of the terrain significantly affects movement of troops, aircraft, 
tanks, and maritime operations in POA 2. For example, a helicopter cannot safely 
land in a wooded environment, an amphibious landing craft must negotiate 
unsatisfactory shorelines, vehicles move slowly through swamps, and soldiers 
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slow considerably when marching uphill. Environmental factors also affect 
mobility. Such examples are adverse weather, nightfall, and smoke, etc. [Ref. 27 
& 28] 
Generally, the simulation area for the terrain coverage is dictated by the 
number of hexes or squares per a known unit of measure (i.e. kilometers, 
meters, etc.).  For this thesis the unit of measure referenced is kilometers.  This 
overall area is known as the playbox.  The playbox can be made as large as 
63,000 hexes, but the cost for this is degradation in fidelity.  Increasing the 
playbox size is done by decreasing the number of hexes or squares per unit of 
measure.  For the size of our simulation the hexes covered an area of 1 square 
kilometer.  At any scale an operator can zoom in to view details such as 
individual entities, roads, rivers, buildings, etc. [Ref. 28]  Operators have at their 
disposal a vast range of weapons, including tracked and wheeled vehicles, 
aircraft, ships, and even systems that are in the development or conceptual stage 
such as the one studied in this thesis.  Individual soldiers may have machine 
guns, rifles, antitank weapons, mortars, and other munitions.  POA 2 models 
these systems in great detail.  These details and parameters can be viewed and 
edited in the Data View section of the POA 2 package.  The Data View window, 
see Figure 26, allows users to create, modify, and edit all system to include C4I 
systems and directed energy weapons.  
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Figure 26.   Data View for Ammunition Properties for Armor Piercing 7.62mm ball 
 
Our map was constructed over the course of two weeks.  Within this time 
the several layers of information were overlayed onto the "map surface" to 
achieve the final product.  The first layer was the background picture of the island 
of Palawan.  Although this picture is not necessary for the conduct of the game, it 
provided us with a reference upon which to build the following layers.  The 
picture itself was created from a map that was cropped into 12 pieces to 
accommodate the file size restrictions of ADC 2, and then reconfigured in the 
ADC 2 map editor.  Elevation data is then input for each hex on the map.  
Elevations ranged from 0 feet at sea level to mountain ranges at 6900 feet.  The 
next layer is terrain data.  The terrain data was chosen based on paper maps of 
Palawan.  Each of our map's 62,013 hexes was designated both an elevation 
and a terrain property. 
Many military operations can be modeled in POA 2. Its strengths are its 
force-on-force engagements, but it is also is able to provide numerous other 
features to the military community, such as: 
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1. Allows for interactions with non-combatants, such as refugees and 
civilian vehicles. 
 
2. Reduce the cost and time of weapons systems development and 
modification. 
 
3. Allow a wide range of input from different agencies and personnel. 
 
POA 2 has the ability to aggregate entities (soldiers, tanks, or other 
individual units) into a group such as squads, platoons, battalions, or a unique 
size force and then view and control that force as one icon.  This allows large 
formations to be easily viewed and controlled while the program tracks and 
records activity at the individual entity level.  When required, an operator can 
select a unit, right click, and examine its status. 
 
Figure 27.   Unit Information Details 
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Weapons effectiveness in POA 2 is determined by probability-of-hit and 
probability-of-kill statistics based on published statistics by DoD and other 
reliable sources, such as Jane’s.  Using this and environmental data, POA 2 
calculates and determines the outcomes of engagements between opposing 
forces.  Not all engagements are kills. POA 2 uses all aspects of engagements to 
determine if a combatant was immobilized, killed, or a miss.  
Human entities begin with a certain amount of morale in POA 2.  Their 
morale level can fluctuate based on the activities of that entity and its initial 
conditions.  For example, a soldier’s morale decreases when he is performing 
more difficult tasks, such as fighting for extended periods of time.  Health and 
training of soldiers can also play a part in POA 2.  These parameters are set by 
the operators and are degraded or increased according to conditions.  
Battle outcomes are computed using a weighted value system.  Values 
are assigned to systems based on their relative combat power.  For example, an 
infantryman may be assigned a value of one and a tank a value of 50.  When an 
engagement occurs, the weight values of the systems involved in the 
engagement are taken into account to adjudicate the outcome.  The weighting 
scheme is consistent through all the forces represented in a particular scenario.   
Simulation operators can analyze the results of the executed simulation in 
the Game Results display window.  This is displayed at the end of a wargame 
and allows the user to gain insight on the outcome of the battle.  For the purpose 
of this thesis, the software development team at HPS simulations created very 
specific MOE Reports that not only measure common battlefield statistics but add 







 Figure 28.   Game Results and MOE Report 
 
One of POA 2’s advantages is its applicability to all the military services 
and government agencies.  Although each service has its own weapons, 
methods of combat operations, and specialized simulation programs and 
perceived threats, POA 2's versatility allows it to be a powerful resource for all of 
them.  Because it has the ability to model all of the services' forces and most 
threats, as well as those of other security organizations, it also encourages better 
coordination among agencies, both in planning missions and in training 
personnel.  
 
F. MODELING THE AJCN IN POA2 
Modeling of the AJCN in POA 2 required a representation of the 3 major 
system capabilities that the AJCN brings to the battlefield: SIGINT, waveform 
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bridging, and jamming.  Through its use of autonomous interactions POA 2 
provided simulated representations for each of these capabilities. In the following 
paragraphs we will step through the implementation of each of these attributes to 
build an AJCN system in POA2. 
The AJCN was mounted on 2 UAV systems and a KC 135 aircraft platform  
which already existed in the POA 2 software package.  The UAVs were the 
Shadow and the Global Hawk.  The manipulation of these aircraft to provide the 
necessary capabilities for the AJCN is done in the Data View window of the POA 
2 simulation package.  The Data View interface provides the ability to modify 
existing platforms and add or delete capabilities as needed.  For the AJCN 
system most of the data was represented in the “Communications/Jamming 
System Data table” of the Data View. The Communications/Jamming System 
Data table contains special systems that can enhance friendly communications 






Figure 29.   Communications and Jamming Systems Table 
 
Communications/Jamming systems in this table are assigned to Weapons 
systems (aircraft, ships, vehicles, troops, etc.) in the Weapons System Data 
Editor.  The commo/jamming system parameter fields used for the AJCN are as 
follows: 
100% Effectiveness Range 
The maximum range, in meters, at which the system will use full 
effectiveness values. 
50% Effectiveness Range  





Unit Levels Affected  
Designates the unit level (i.e. Battalion, Brigade, etc.) that a system will 
influence. 
Transmission Time Factor 
This field determines the rate of increase or decrease in transmission 
duration between entities or between an entity and his higher headquarters.  The 
change is entered in relation to the 100% effectiveness range.  For example, if 
the time increases by a factor of two, 200% would be entered to relate a doubling 
of the time it would take to execute a transmission.  Values less than 100% relate 
an increase in the speed of a transmission and 100% relates no effect on 
transmission time.  
Transmission Types Affected 
Designates the types of transmissions the system will affect, data and/or 
voice. 
Transmission Configuration  
The configuration describes the situation of the sender to the receiver, 
based on their position relative to the ground surface.  Units at elevations of 10 
meters or less AGL (above ground level), are considered on the surface.  This 
value determines which types of transmissions are affected. 
Detection Probability 
The known probability that the system will detect enemy systems. 
Detection Type 
Designates who will be detected by the system; friendly or enemy units. 
Effectiveness Adjustments 
Any of the following situations that will reduce the system’s effectiveness:  
Enemy EW: Expressed as a known percentage 
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Enemy Com Level:  The enemy force’s communications level (as 
determined by the average command delay) will reduce the effectiveness of 
jamming and detection of enemy units.  The loss will range between 1% for 
command delay values of less than 300 seconds, and complete (100%) loss for 
forces with zero second command delays.  The reduction is determined 
hyperbolically, so that a command delay of 60 seconds only causes a 25% 
reduction. 
Enemy Communication Discipline:  If the sending unit is an enemy, its 
communications discipline rating reduces detection effectiveness by 1/2% for 
each rating point.  It does not affect jamming (time adjustment). 
Enemy EW unit in range:  If there is an enemy EW unit within range, the 
enemy force’s EW rating will be doubled, and then will proportionally decrease 
effectiveness in all areas. For example, a rating of 25 will make the system 50% 
less effective.  
LOS Required:  If the situation warrants, the system must have an LOS to 
the sending and/or receiving unit that does not hit the ground.   
For speeding up friendly transmission, the system must have an LOS to 
both the sender and receiver. 
For jamming enemy communications, the system must have an LOS to 
the receiver. 

























This analysis portion of the thesis applies only to the closed-loop 
constructive simulation runs that were completed using POA2 for the purpose of 
gathering analytical results to complement the insights gained through the 
wargaming process.  The results will be presented primarily in table and graph 
format to provide the reader with an understanding of the simulation output.  
Insights that can be gleaned from the output will be presented following an 
appropriate presentation of the data. 
A summary table below, Figure 30, shows the mean values for the data 
generated from each of the six scenarios.  A brief explanation of the data 
represented in the table follows. 
Baseline 1-KC135 1-Shadow 1-KC135 + 1-Shadow 1-KC135 + 2-Shadow 1-KC135 + 5-Shadow
US Begin Strength 4028.4 4078.4 4030.267 4080.4 4082.133333 4088.766667
# US Killed 382.267 334.333 114.1 255.8333333 81.46666667 45.83333333
USKilled/BeginStrength 0.09489 0.08198 0.028312 0.064239802 0.019956898 0.011209735
     
China Begin Strength 1769.23 1769.6 1769.8 1769.033333 1768.6 1768.2
#China_Killed 458.933 401.7 308.8 548.5 861.1333333 830.5333333
ChinaKilled/BeginStrength 0.25938 0.22701 0.174496 0.303675214 0.486911788 0.469727023
     
ForcePts lost to Friendly Fire 15.9333 15.9667 5.433333 9.4 1.3 1.733333333
  
Detected # Detected by US + AJCN 662.3 698.8 1237.1 1342.733333 1412.766667 1668
# Detected by US 662.3 698.8 785.5667 811.4 864.1 1075.266667
# Detected by AJCN 0 0 451.5333 531.3333333 548.6666667 592.7333333
# Detected by China 151.033 140.786 168.5667 163.1 179.9666667 200.4333333
  
Total AJCNS 0 1 1 2 3 6
AJCN Losses 0 0 1 1 2 4.366666667
     
MOE#1 Force Exchange Ratio 0.87492 0.89805 0.449475 0.636385 0.118887867 0.142010077
US_Killed/China_Killed      
     





Figure 30.   POA2 Results Table (Mean Values for all Data Recorded) 
 
The averaged raw attrition data for the US and Chinese forces is located 
in the upper portion of Figure 30.  Each column represents a different scenario 
with a representative descriptive title.  The column titles relate how many AJCN 
were in the scenario using the number of host platforms.  Fratricide, acquisition 
and AJCN loss data are presented as the means of the 30 trials conducted for 
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each scenario.  The numerical values for the scenario specific MOEs are also 




































































Figure 31.   Mean Attrition Data for US and Chinese Forces 
 
The Mean Attrition Data graph in Figure 31 shows a comparative view of 
the mean attrition data of the two forces over the six scenarios.  These numbers 
are not relative with respect to the total quantity of forces that each side began 
with; this will be addressed by MOE #2.  This graph does show the increase in 
Chinese attrition as the number of AJCNs is increased over the different 
scenarios.  And conversely, save for the 1-Shadow and 1-KC135 scenario, how 
the US attrition decreases as more AJCN are incorporated into the battle.   
Following the procedures outlined in Devore Chapter 10, we conducted a 
multiple comparisons analysis between the U.S. casualty means for each 
scenario. [Ref. 33]  We used the Single-Factor ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) 
test and found that the probability of seeing such an extreme difference in the 
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attrition data by chance (due to Monte Carlo modeling) was 1.31 , far, far 
less than .01.  In other words, the differences in attrition means are real and not 
due to chance.  We also conducted the same test for the Chinese forces and the 


















































































































Boxplot: US & China Attrition
Figure 32.    Mean Attrition Data for US and Chinese Forces 
 
The boxplots of the attrition data in Figure 32 above show the paired data 
of US and Chinese attrition for each scenario.  The mean value of Chinese forces 
destroyed is consistently higher than that of US forces.  The first three scenarios, 
Baseline, 1-Shadow, and 1-KC135, produces similar results for enemy attrition, 
whereas the final three scenarios all produced substantial increases as the 
number of AJCN increased.  The difference between these two groups of 
scenarios is the quantity of AJCN.  The first three scenarios had either none or 
just one AJCN, while the latter scenarios had at least one AJCN operating in the 
low tier and one AJCN in the middle tier.  This dramatic increase of 50% more 
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enemy attrition when more than one tier of AJCN was utilized may be traced to 
the increased reachback and waveform bridging capability provided through a 
two tier array of AJCN. 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the KC-135 is the middle-tier platform for 
the AJCN and in these scenarios acts as the "higher echelon" link for the bottom-
tier Shadow-platformed AJCN.  When looking at the graph in Figure 32, we can 
see that when the middle or bottom-tier AJCN platform is acting alone, the 
enemy attrition levels remain nearly consistent with that of the baseline scenario 
with no AJCN systems.  Once we have a bottom- and middle-tier "team" of AJCN 
there is the previously noted dramatic increase in enemy attrition.  This "teaming" 
effect of using at least two tiers of AJCN coverage vice only the bottom-tier or 
only the middle-tier produces considerable results that can be attributed to a 
more stable system of coverage by enabling a self-healing network and the 
increased coverage provided to friendly units of both enemy and friendly 
situational awareness. 












































































Figure 33.   MOE #1 Mean Data 
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MOE #1, Force Exchange Ratio, gives a raw, unweighted, measure of the 
attrition levels of the two forces involved.  The ratio is calculated by dividing the 
value of US forces destroyed by the value of Chinese forces destroyed.  Given 
this formula, from the US perspective, the US wants a lower value as close to 
zero as possible.  This conveys that the attrition levels of the enemy are greater 






















































MOE #1: Force Exchange Ratio
 
Figure 34.   MOE #1 Boxplots 
 
It can be seen in Figure 33 how the Force Exchange Ratio generally 
decreases over the first three scenarios, spikes during the 1-KC135 and 1-
Shadow scenario, and then drops significantly for the final two scenarios.  The 
boxplots in Figure 34 also show a greater variability in the data for the 1-KC135 
and 1-Shadow scenario.  Given the closed nature of the simulation, many factors 
may have contributed to this outcome.  When looking back at the mean value 
chart in Figure 30, we see that at least one of the AJCN platforms is destroyed 
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during the course of each scenario, and except for the last scenario, 1-KC135 
and 5-Shadows, we have all but one AJCN platform being destroyed.  While we 
cannot determine when the AJCN were destroyed, when there was only one 
bottom-tier and one middle-tier AJCN platforms, (1-KC135 and 1-Shadow 
scenario) and one was shot down we have a significant increase in both friendly 
and enemy attrition.  An increase of this level of attrition over the other scenarios 
relates a greater number of engagements of greater intensity.  We deduce that 
two primary factors can explain this phenomenon: the increased situational 
awareness provided by the AJCN and the morale of the Chinese after shooting 
down a US "reconnaissance" platform.  The increased situation awareness 
provided to the US forces may have brought them to "seek out" the Chinese 
positions.  The increased morale of the Chinese forces may have "strengthened 
their resolve" when encountered by the oncoming US forces.  The question then 
arises, why didn't this happen in the following scenarios if nearly all but one 
AJCN platform was shot down?  An answer follows. 
As noted before, the closed nature of the POA2 runs does not currently 
allow us to go back through and observe when the specific AJCN platform was 
shot down.  However, given the operating range and speed of the two platforms, 
and the outcome of the 1-KC135 scenario we deduce that it was the Shadow 
UAV platforms that were shot down vice the KC-135 platform.  This being 
assumed case, when there were more than one Shadow platform, after the first 
Shadow was shot down the second Shadow platform continued to provide the 
US forces its suite of enablers which gave the US forces a marked advantage 
over even a Chinese force with elevated morale. 
This situation makes the case for redundancy of coverage at each of the 
various tiers of AJCN coverage and careful assessment of platform capabilities 
when deciding which platform will take the AJCN into the fight and have the 
greatest capability to bring it back.   
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MOE #2: Fractional Exchange Ratio
Figure 36.   MOE#2:  Fractional Exchange Ratio Boxplots 
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The Fractional Exchange Ratio, see Figures 35 and 36, provides a 
weighted means of evaluating the attrition of the two forces.  From the US 
perspective, the US wants this number to be as close to zero as possible, similar 
to MOE #1.  The data for this MOE reveals that the US lost proportionately nearly 
44% fewer forces during the first four scenarios; as determined by the relative 
number of US forces lost during the Baseline and the 1-KC135 & 1-Shadow 
scenarios.  However, when more than one AJCN was incorporated into one of 
the tiers, in this case the bottom tier, we have a distinct drop to 89% fewer forces 
being lost by the US; determined by the relative number of US forces lost during 
the Baseline and the 1-KC135 & 5-Shadow scenarios.  Again, although the last 
two scenarios also experienced a significant amount of AJCN kills, to be 
discussed later in detail with MOE #5, the presence of additional AJCN platforms 
for even any amount of time provided the advantage to gain decisive victory to 
the US forces.   
As previously discussed, the use of a weighted measure for the 
representation of the value of a system renders this MOE difficult to assess 
without a greater explanation of which systems are represented by the data in 
Figures 37 and 38.  The marked increase or decrease between scenarios could 
be accounted for by the significant loss of individual soldiers whose weight value 










































































































































MOE #3: US Fratricide Boxplots
 
Figure 38.   MOE #3: US Friendly Fire Boxplots 
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Figures 37 and 38 show the general negative slope of MOE #3, U.S. 
Fratricide.  This trend confirms the concept that greater situational awareness 
provided to any force will decrease the number of fratricide incidents.  However, 
there are two issues that are brought to light in the data we obtained:  two tiered 
arrays of AJCN enable greater friendly situational awareness and situational 
awareness of enemy and friendly units must be comprehensively assimilated 
before action is taken.   
The first item solidifies the two-tier concept discussed earlier in this 
chapter.  The redundancy provided by the bottom- and middle-tier AJCN working 
together provides the friendly forces a marked advantage as observed through 
greater enemy attrition, less friendly attrition, and less friendly fratricide.   
As previously noted, the 1-KC135 & 1-Shadow scenario brings a 
somewhat incongruous outcome:  friendly and enemy attrition is higher than 
previous scenarios and friendly fratricide is higher.  Our hypothesis for this 
scenario considers the benefit provided by the two-tier AJCN array combined 
with the early demise of the Shadow, the bottom-tier AJCN platform.  We 
considered the following sequence of events as a possible explanation for the 
increased fratricide seen in the 1-KC135 & 1-Shadow scenario.  The situational 
awareness on the enemy situation provided by the two-tier AJCN array offers the 
U.S. forces a quality assessment of the enemy posture.  Upon the U.S. force’s 
movement against the enemy forces the bottom-tier AJCN is shot down, 
degrading the updating capability for both enemy and friendly situational 
awareness.  Based on the pre-Shadow demise, artillery missions are sequenced 
and fired.  Fire missions incur an inordinate number of friendly casualties due to 
the inhibited view of the battlefield caused by the lack of redundancy in AJCN 
coverage. 
POA 2 contains a valuable tool that does not allow for the "double" 
counting of acquired systems.  This is key for our evaluation of the AJCN’s 
contribution of providing a greater amount of situational awareness as measured 
by the acquisition of enemy units.  POA 2 gives acquisition credit to the system 
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that gets the highest level of resolution on an enemy system.  For example, a 
friendly aircraft observes a system on the ground but cannot determine whether it 
is enemy or friendly and an AJCN observes the same system and classifies it as 
an enemy tank.  The AJCN will get the acquisition “credit” since it had the latest 
and highest resolution acquisition event on the enemy tank.   
We see an interesting trend in the data in that the AJCN systems acquire 
a somewhat consistent amount of enemy systems while the acquisitions of the 
remainder of the US force steadily increases as the number of AJCN are 
increased in the scenarios, see Figures 39 and 40.  This can relate the 
phenomena where the AJCN provides the situational awareness to the US forces 
that then move to engage the AJCN acquired enemy and additional supporting 
enemy systems and units.  Thus the AJCN is not only a provider of situational 
awareness in itself, but it provides a mechanism for the effective positioning of 
friendly forces to mass their forces effectively on an enemy resulting in greater 
enemy attrition and lesser friendly attrition. 
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MOE #4: Acquisition Rate Boxplot
Figure 40.   MOE #4: Acquisition Rate Boxplots 
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The POA 2 simulation does not currently let us look back through the 
conduct of a closed loop run to determine which AJCN platform was attritted 
during the respective scenarios.  As stated before, given the flight profile of the 
bottom-tier Shadow UAV and the results from the 1-KC135 scenario, we deduce 
that the Shadow UAV is the AJCN platform that was destroyed during the course 
of the scenarios, leaving the KC135 remaining to provide overarching support to 
the US forces.    
When looking at the difference in attrition data between the last two 
scenarios, we see a decrease in the number of both US and Chinese forces 
destroyed.  There is a 44% decrease in the quantity of US forces destroyed from 
the 1-KC135/2-Shadow scenario to the 1KC-135/5-Shadow scenario.  However, 
there is also a 3.5% decrease in the value of Chinese attritted.  When these 
values are looked at in light of the number of AJCN platforms remaining in the air 
at the termination of the battle, we see that the final scenario of 1KC-135/5-
Shadows retains an average 1.64 AJCN to the end of the scenario, see Figures 
41 and 42.  Again we deduce that the KC-135 remained throughout the entire 
scenario and that four of the five Shadows are attritted during the battle.  We see 
that the maintenance of the two-tier AJCN array greatly impedes the Chinese 
ability to attrite US forces as it did in previous scenarios.  This result reinforces 
the concept of maintaining a tiered network of AJCN to provide continuous and 


























































MOE #5: AJCN Survivability Boxplots
 




A. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis was to gain insights on the employment of the 
AJCN as an enabler for network centric warfare.  The AJCN provides 
interoperability between C4I systems in use throughout the DoD and the civilian 
sector.  The wargaming and simulation of a scenario with the AJCN's capabilities 
modeled provide a means to glean insight into considerations that should be 
addressed in its development and employment. 
B. WARGAME INSIGHTS 
 During the course of the wargame many different issues facing the 
employment of the AJCN surfaced.  The issues addressed below are subjective 
in nature, based on the actions observed during the execution of the wargame.  
They should be considered within the context of the wargame's characteristics 
that affect its outcome.  These two main characteristics are the scenario and the 
staff's level of experience.  The scenario's littoral setting and the adhoc nature of 
the two staffs may have impacted the observations taken from this wargame.  
However, these issues are offset by the collaborative experience represented by 
the students populating the two staffs.  We feel that the wargame presented a 
good testbed to gain the generalizeable insights we needed.  The insights are 
formatted with respect to the behavior or response observed (Observation) 
followed by a means to address the issue(s) raised in the Observation 
(Recommendation).   
1. High Priority Target 
Observation: AJCN is a High Priority Target (HPT).  Given a technically 
advanced enemy, the activities and capabilities of the AJCN will be identified and 
targeted by the enemy.  The enemy's capability to target and destroy the AJCN is 
directly related to the platform being used to transport the AJCN.  Consideration 
must be given to the survivability of the supporting platform given the mission 
and terrain over which it will operate.  The use of "slower" and lower altitude 
platforms should be carefully monitored and adjusted to the capabilities of enemy 
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air defense and aviation capabilities.  This issue was addressed in detail in a 
thesis drafted by Craig J. Werenskjold where he referenced the vulnerability of 
Hunter UAVs to both surface to air missiles and unconventional enemy tactics 
during the Kosovo conflict.  Serbian forces would fly a Mi-8 HIP helicopter 
alongside the UAV and destroy it using machine gun fire.  The effective enemy 
tactic was countered by a concerted Allied air campaign against Serbian 
helicopter operations with NATO strike fighters. [Ref. 24]  This example 
reinforces the key role that in depth Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield 
(IPB) and the planning of any Air Tasking Order (ATO) play in the effective 
employment of the AJCN's capabilities. 
Recommendation:  The selection of the AJCN's supporting platform must 
consider the platform's survivability characteristics paired against the enemy's 
capabilities of engaging that platform.   
The AJCN's electronic jamming capabilities may be required to act as a 
means of self-preservation against enemy air defense units.  This use of 
channels for "self-defense" needs to be considered during the AJCN Tasking 
process to alleviate the possible in-course reallocation of channel resources to 
accommodate self-defense and the consequent dismissal of another previously 
planned mission.   
The AJCN Planning SOP should include a recommended number or 
percentage of channels that can be reserved for self-defense and during mission 
allocation. 
2. Vulnerable During Early Entry Operations 
Observation: AJCN is vulnerable during early entry with no air supremacy.  
The use of UAVs in recent campaigns consistently sees them being used 
autonomously as gatherers of intelligence or providers of targeting information to 
assets that are not local to the UAV and are definitely not providing any 
protective coverage for the UAV.  Given the AJCN's SIGINT and Information 
Warfare (IW) capabilities, it is implied that the AJCN's supporting air platform be 
in a position of possible vulnerability to enemy air forces and air defense assets 
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and the time requirement of the intelligence provided by the AJCN may not allow 
the achievement of air superiority prior to their employment.  Without an active 
self defense mechanism inherent to the supporting air platform, the primary 
method of defense is altitude.  If the supporting platform operates above the 
range capabilities of the enemy air defense and above the "normal" operating 
altitude of enemy air forces, then it inherits a different level of security than if 
operating at lower altitudes.   
Recommendation:  During initial phases of operation, use only AJCN 
supporting platforms that can operate at altitudes above expected enemy air 
defense ranges and enemy air force operating altitudes.  Also, consider ground-
based platforms for AJCN. 
Ground-based platforms could be integrated into early entry and 
conventional forces deployment to provide the AJCN's capabilities to the force 
without unnecessarily endangering an aerial platform.  The AJCN should be 
emplaced on terrain features that maximize its effectiveness (i.e. a terrain feature 
that gives it an unobstructed "view" of the battlefield).     
3. AJCN Seen as Its Platform 
Observation:  Commanders did not devote enough attention to planning 
and using the resources provided by the AJCN.  This observation may have its 
roots within the context of the wargame itself; however, the actions of the 
commanders and their staff should be addressed considering the participants are 
those that will fill actual staff roles in the future.  
The AJCN was seen as its platform.  Namely, the UAV the AJCN's 
capabilities are mounted on.  The lesson here is that a UAV by any other name is 
NOT just another UAV.  Although additional capabilities were inherent with the 
AJCN-UAV, the capabilities and employment considerations were not exploited 
to maximize the AJCN's effects on the battlefield.  The AJCN-UAV was used in a 
manner "normally" associated with UAVs with respect to an intelligence-
gathering mode of employment. 
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Recommendation:  The employment of a new system requires the 
education of those who will employ it.  This process should not only educate the 
operators who will physically operate the system, but the commanders, and their 
staffs, who will decide the best manner to deploy the system.  
Great caution should be taken when considering the air platform upon 
which the AJCN will be mounted with respect to any other capabilities that are 
"mounted" or inherent to the air platform.  If the air platform has varying and 
competing capabilities mounted upon it, then decisions will be made based on 
which mission capability has "priority" for a certain period of time. This conflict 
greatly diminishes the combat effectiveness of the AJCN and any other system 
co-mounted on the air platform.   
Significant effort should be made to configure air platforms with systems 
that complement not only each others capabilities but allow for a synergistic 
multiplication of effects on the battlefield.  An example would be the AJCN 
mounted on an Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) with laser designator 
capabilities.  Using the SIGINT capabilities, the AJCN can identify a large source 
of electromagnetic energy related to a large enemy command center; translate 
this information into targeting data that the laser designator can lock in on which 
will guide the Hellfire missile mounted on the UCAV to its target. 
4. Need for Effective Information Processing 
Observation:  Unless resources are dedicated to assimilate information in 
a meaningful manner, the benefits provided by the AJCN will be limited.  During 
the course of the wargame, information provided by the AJCN was disseminated 
to the other units in the effected areas but there was no collective assimilation of 
the information at a higher level to allow for evaluation and analysis.  This 
occurred due to the primary reason of personnel availability, but brings forth the 
issue of data presentation and manipulation through the CRS. 
Recommendation:  Ensure that the CRS provides the ability for 
operators/analysts to quickly obtain and manipulate data in a manner that it can 
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be presented to the commander and his staff so that allows for quick assimilation 
of and action upon the information may be taken. 
5. C2 of AJCN 
Observation:  Command and control of AJCN assets must be clearly 
delineated in advance with a continuing mechanism to smoothly shift 
priorities/ownership to the needs of the commander.  The capabilities provided by 
the AJCN incur a great deal of requests for use by separate commanders who 
deem their portion of the mission the most crucial.  UCAV use in Afghanistan 
provides a clear example of the requirement for a solid chain of command to 
oversee their use.  During the course of operations, UCAV control stations would 
receive calls from high-ranking commanders in the area requesting the use of 
one or more UCAVs.  The UCAV control stations referred them to their superiors 
at higher headquarters. 
Recommendation:  The AJCN's capabilities mandate that the highest 
levels of the CoCom's staff be involved in the allocation of its resources.  Also, a 
certain amount of rank should be inherent to the AJCN's control section to 
prevent any misuse or abuse of the AJCN for missions not properly channeled 
through the CoCom's staff. 
6. Adjustable "Radius of Coverage" for AJCN Waveform Bridging 
Observation:  In order to deconflict communications between ground units, 
the radius of the AJCNs waveform bridging capabilities must be constrained.  
This implies that the AJCN platform may have to fly at a lower altitude to 
constrain the radius of coverage to only those ground combatants requiring the 
capability.  An example of how the AJCN's radius of capabilities would be 
detrimental is when it operates above a Unit of Action (UA).  The Unit of 
Employments (UE) comprising the UA may use some of the same frequencies 
for communications in their subordinate units.  Only due to the range between 
the UE's do these separate units not "step" on one another during the course of 
operations.  If the AJCN were scheduled to "bridge" a UE frequency to a Marine 
unit operating on its right flank and the UE to its left flank shared that same 
frequency; then both units within both UE's operating on that frequency would be 
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talking to the Marine unit.  This "over-bridging" by the AJCN could incur a great 
deal of miscommunication between the units and possibly result in dangerous 
conditions for them.   
Recommendation:  Develop the capability to adjust the radius, or cone, of 
coverage of the AJCN's waveform bridging capability to negate the possibility of 
causing an unnecessary and possibly dangerous overlap of communication 
networks.   
 
C. SIMULATION INSIGHTS 
Insights gleaned from the POA 2 simulation runs reinforce issues seen 
during the execution of the wargame and reveal some additional items not 
previously addressed.  The simulation's small scale scenario lends itself to 
provide foundational insight which can be extrapolated to relate to larger 
scenarios.  Issues that correspond with a wargame insight will reference the 
paragraph number from the Wargame Insights Section to address the similarity 
of findings.   
1. Careful Assessment of Supporting Platform Performance 
Parameters 
Observation:  Bottom-tier AJCN platforms were consistently engaged and 
destroyed.  This insight corresponds well with insight numbers 1 and 2 from the 
previous section, Wargame Insights.  These addressed the designation of an 
AJCN carrier platform as a high priority target and the vulnerability of UAV 
systems that operate in at altitudes below 25,000 feet.  In the POA 2 runs the 
Shadow-mounted AJCN were consistently engaged and destroyed, whereas the 
KC-135-mounted AJCN were not destroyed during the runs. 
Recommendation:  The consistent engagement of the low altitude and 
relatively slow-flying Shadow UAV platform reinforces the need for a detailed 
assessment of enemy air defense capabilities when planning AJCN operations.  
Both vehicle-mounted and shoulder-fired weapon systems must be considered 
for a proper threat assessment. 
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2. Use of "Decoy" Systems During Initial Phase of Battle 
Observation:  The final scenario, 1-KC135 and 5-Shadows, ended with at 
least one bottom-tier AJCN platform still operating.  The three to four other 
bottom-tier platforms essentially served as "decoys" to "gainfully employ" the 
enemy air defense systems.   
Recommendation:  Use decoy aerial platforms to "gainfully employ" 
enemy air defense systems during the early stages of the battle to increase the 
AJCN platform's survivability.  Decoys may come in the guise of less expensive 
UAVs or in a chaff system that is deployed from the AJCN platform when 
engaged by enemy air defense systems.   
3. Maintain 2-Tier Coverage 
Observation:  The POA 2 data consistently revealed an advantage to US 
forces when two tiers of AJCN coverage were maintained for a greater portion of 
the battle.  The two-tier coverage serves to increase the area of AJCN coverage 
and to ensure consistency of coverage provided by a self-healing network of 
redundant AJCN capability. 
Recommendation:  The AJCN should be employed in a tiered array to 
maximize its contribution to the supported forces.  A minimum of two tiers should 
be employed to increase the quantity and quality of services provided to the 
supported force. 
D. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis has great opportunities for future work with respect to more 
detailed analysis of the AJCN system and in the evaluation of constructive 
simulation database generation and maintenance.  The AJCN is still within the 
Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) process, and thus the final 
design and employment can be greatly influenced by future analysis of the 
system through the use of wargaming and simulation.  The lessons learned 
during the course of this thesis concerning the vital importance of a solid 
database foundation upon which to build a simulation experiment can also be a 
venue for further study.   
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 1. Continued AJCN Analysis 
The use of a live wargaming event to gain insight into the employment of 
the AJCN was invaluable.  However, further analysis could be done using a 
constructive simulation model to facilitate the generation of analytical results.  
Using a constructive simulation would afford the ability to conduct multiple runs in 
multiple scenarios to achieve an even greater breadth of insight than that 
accomplished in this thesis.   
The choice of constructive simulation should be based on the research 
questions that are seeking to be answered and the simulation's ability to 
accommodate the gathering of data to fulfill the Measures of Effectiveness' data 
requirements.   
2. Database Analysis of DoD Constructive Simulations 
A great learning point generated through this thesis was the vital 
importance of an accurate database.  The database is foundational to the 
successful execution of any type of simulation for both analytical and training 
purposes.  A possible topic of research is to investigate the database content and 
management of a subset of the constructive simulations used within the 


















LIST OF REFERENCES 
1.  Garstka, John J., "Network Centric Warfare:  An Overview of Emerging 
Theory."  [Joint Staff Directorate for C4 Systems] (Dec 2000 [cited 6 August    
2004]); available from the World Wide Web @ 
http://www.more.org/publications/phalanx/dec00/feature.htm 
 
2.  Adaptive Joint C4ISR Node (AJCN) Advanced Concept Technology  
     Demonstration (ACTD) Interim-Joint Military Utility Assessment (I-JMUA)   
     Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Version 1.0.  (31 March 2004). 
 
3.  Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, Volume 1,    
     Chapter 2, page 5.  [(cited 12 June 2004)]  Available from the World Wide    
     Web @ http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/01/01_02.pdf 
 
4.  U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part 1, Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986   
     [(cited 1 June 2004)]  Available from the World Wide Web @  
     http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/title_10.html 
 
5. Briefing given by CAPT Hansen on 3/29/04 and 3/30/04.  Available on the    
    World Wide Web @ http://nps.blackboard.com/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp? 
    tab=courses&url=/bin/common/course.pl?course_id=_4051_1 
 
6.  Haag, Jason L.  "OIF veterans discuss lessons."  ([cited 15 August 2004])   
     Available from the World Wide Web @ http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp? 
     storyID=123005347 
 
7.  Perla, Peter P.  The Art of Wargaming:  A Guide for Professionals and  
     Hobbyists.  Annapolis:  United Sates Naval Institute, 1990. 
 
8.  Adaptive Joint C4ISR Node System Operational Concept (ACTD Version 1.2),  
     8 April 2003.  
 
9.  Tzu, Sun.  The Art of War.  Trans. Samuel B. Griffith.  Oxford:  Oxford  
     University Press, 1963. 
 
10.  Field Manual 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, Final Draft.   
       Washington, D. C.:  Department of the Army, 1996. 
 
11.  Companion, Michael, & Mortimer, Charles.  Designing for Change:  A  
       modeling and Simulation System Approach.  ([15 February 2004])   
       Available on the World Wide Web @ http://www.link.com/pdfs/itsec2.pdf 
 
12.  Department of Defense 5000.59-P, "Modeling and Simulation Master Plan",  
       October 1995. 
87 
13.  Joint Publication (1-02). 
 
14.  Simulation Officer's Handbook, Version 1.0, October 30, 2003. 
 
15.  United States Army Redstone Technical Test Center (RTTC).  "What We Do;  
       Modeling, Simulation, and Hardware/Human-in-the-Loop Technology  
       Integrated into Testing."  ([cited 15 August 2004])  Available on the World  
       Wide Web @ http://www.rttc.army.mil/whatwedo/primary_ser/modeling.htm 
 
16.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI 3170.01C) “Joint  
       Capabilities Integration and Development System.” 
 
17.  JRTS Overview.  ([cited 16 August 2004])  Available on the World Wide Web  
       @ http://jtrs.army.mil/sections/overview/fset_overview.html 
 
18.  Hunter UAV Forum.  ([cited 17 August 2004]) Available on the World Wide  
       Web @ http://www.uavforum.com/vehicles/production/hunter.htm 
 
19.  Office of the Secretary of Defense Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Reliability  
       Study.  Design, Performance and Analysis of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle  
       Systems, Short Course 7-11 April 2003.  Monterey, CA. 
 
20.  Shimamoto, Faith.  Simulating Warfare Is No Video Game.  ([cited 19  
       August, 2004])  Available on the World Wide Web @  
       http://www.llnl.gov/str/Shimamoto.html 
 
21.  JCATS Standard DB Initiative.ppt (on H: drive) 
 
22.  Peck, Michael.  National Defense Magazine, May 2003, Feature Article,  
      "Pentagon Unhappy About Drone Aircraft Reliability, Rising Mishap Rates of  
      Unmanned Vehicles Attributed to Rushed Deployments,"  ([cited 19 August,  
      2004])  Available on the World Wide Web @ http://www. 
      nationaldefensemagazine.org/article.cfm?Id=1105 
 
23.  "PRC Begins Week-Long War Games."  Reuters, 17 July, 2004.   ([cited 19  
       August 2004]).  Available on the World Wide Web @  
       http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-170704.htm 
 
24.  Werenskjold, Craig J.  "The Effect of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems on  
       Precision Engagement."  Thesis, June 2002.  Naval Postgraduate School,     
       Monterey, CA. 
 





26.  Kaplan, Ian, and Kaplan, Linda.  Pseudo-random Numbers.  ([cited 1  
       September 2004]).  Available on the World Wide Web @  
       http://www.bearcave.com/misl/misl_tech/wavelets/hurst/random.html 
 
27.  Hamilton, Scott S. (1997). Aide De Camp -2 User Manual [Software]. HPS  
       Simulations, Santa Clara CA. 
 
28.  Hamilton, Scott S. (2003). Point of Attack -2 User Manual [Software]. HPS 
       Simulations, Santa Clara CA. 
 
 
29.  Glossary Terms. ([cited 15 December, 2003])  Available on the World Wide  
       Web @ http://ciao.gov/ciao_document_library/glossary/C.htm 
 
30.  U.S. Army Field Manual 8-10-3 Division Medical Operations Center Tactics,  
       Techniques, and Procedures-Glossary.  Washington, D.C., Headquarters  
       Department of the Army.  
 
31.  McCarthy, Michael.  Informal discussion in June 2004.  Monterey, CA. 
 
32.  MK19 40mm Machine Gun, MOD 3 (Weapon Characteristic Summary).   
       ([cited 9 September 2004])  Available on the World Wide Web @  
       http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/mk19.htm 
 
33.  Devore, Jay L.  Probability and Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences, 

























INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, VA   
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 
3.   LTC Saverio Manago 
 Department of Operations Research 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA   
 
4.   Professor Tom Lucas 
 Department of Operations Research 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA   
